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HIS article attempts to sharpen perspective on the concept of
"confidential relationship" as a basis for extending equity jurisdic-
tion. The concept is not new. The courts in this country began
over a hundred years ago to hold that equitable remedies, and the attend-
ant concepts of uberrima fides, full disclosure, and the avoidance of con-
flict of interest, apply not only to formal fiduciary relationships, such as
trustee-beneficiary, attorney-client, doctor-patient and the like, but also
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to a wide variety of others, which the courts labeled "confidential rela-
tionships." The development of the doctrine defining this concept and its
boundaries has been largely uniform among the jurisdictions. However,
the doctrine has typically been so broadly stated that it carries very little
substantive content. If the words of the courts are to be taken literally, a
confidential relationship giving rise to fiduciary obligation may include
any business, social, or purely personal relationship in which one party
justifiably places trust and confidence in another to care for his or her
welfare and interests.' But the breadth of these statements is seriously
misleading if unaccompanied by a guiding context.2
1. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962); Liebergesell v. Evans,
613 P.2d 1170, 1176 (Wash. 1980) ("A fiduciary relationship arises as a matter of law be-
tween an attorney and his client or a doctor and his patient, for example. But a fiduciary
relationship can also arise in fact regardless of the relationship in law between the par-
ties."); Adickes v. Andreoli, 600 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1980, writ dism'd) ("A confidential relationship may arise not only from the technical rela-
tionships, but may also arise informally from moral, social, domestic, or purely personal
relationships."). See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 472, cmt. c (1932):
A fiduciary position.., includes not only the position of one who is a trustee,
executor, administrator, or the like, but that of agent, attorney, trusted busi-
ness adviser, and indeed any person whose relation with another is such that
the latter justifiably expects his welfare to be cared for by the former.
2. The necessary context involves much more than dominance by one party wrong-
fully exercised over the other, although the courts often emphasize the dominance factor
when discussing confidential relationships. Dominance, in itself, connotes nothing more
than power; it is the big over the little, the strong over the weak, the master over the
servant. When that power is abused, the law is well equipped to police that abuse under a
variety of doctrinal rubrics which, in the current vernacular, it labels generally "uncon-
sciounability." In confidential relationships, however, dominance is the necessary result of
a trust and confidence reasonably reposed. It is the consequence of the reposing of trust.
If the trust was reasonably conveyed, the conveyance does give rise to a dominance, the
abuse of which represents a violation of the trust and the breach of the confidential rela-
tionship. Without the abuse, there is no breach of the relationship. The dominance, and
the abuse thereof, is thus a necessary concomitant of the breach, but not of the relationship
itself. Even where the dominance itself exists prior to the reposing of trust, the dominance
merely furnishes the basis for the reasonableness of the reposing of trust. It is not an
independent element of the relationship itself, and the resulting dominance says no more
than that the party in whom the trust is reposed was able to abuse that trust and to do what
he wrongfully did. This dominance also largely explains why the plaintiff did not prevent
the abuse. But it is understandable, given the necessary interrelation between trust and
dominance, that the courts in confidential relationship cases sometimes erroneously focus
on the consequence rather than the cause. See, e.g., In re Estate of Beal, 769 P.2d 150, 155
(Okla. 1989) (in a confidential relationship "on the one side there is an overmastering
influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed;" a confi-
dential relationship is one "where there is weakness on one side and strength on the other
resulting in dependence or trust justifiably reposed in the stronger"); Mitchell v. Smith, 779
S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (confidential relationship is any relationship which
gives one person dominance and control over another); see also Kelly v. Allen, 558 S.W.2d
845, 848 (Tenn. 1977). Better-reasoned decisions give primacy to the reposing of trust
rather than to the resulting dominance. See Apple v. Apple, 95 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ill. 1950)
("A confidential or fiduciary relationship exists in all cases where trust and confidence are
reposed in another who thereby gains a resulting influence and superiority."); lacometti v.
Frassinelli, 494 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (a confidential relationship is one
"where confidence is placed by one in the other and the recipient of that confidence is the
dominant personality, with ability, because of the confidence, to influence and exercise
dominion over the weaker or dominated party."). The significant majority of decisions do
emphasize the necessity of a trust and confidence, reasonably reposed, and treat the result-
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Determining the existence of a confidential relationship is further com-
plicated by the general rule that the determination is a question of fact.
Indeed, confidential relationships have been labeled "fact-based" fiduci-
ary relationships to distinguish them from formal ones. 3 Ostensibly this
represents an extraordinary abdication by the equity chancellor of its au-
thority to determine when equity jurisdiction will intervene.
The analysis that follows will demonstrate that, judicial rhetoric
notwithstanding, the concept of confidential relationship as a means for
invoking equity jurisdiction applies to only a narrow range of human rela-
tionships. In actuality, although these relationships are indeed "fact-
based," the trier of fact plays but a small part in determining their exist-
ence. The chancellor has in fact relinquished little discretion.
I. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
The essence of a confidential relationship is fiduciary obligation. 4 It is
the extraordinary nature of this obligation that necessitates the rarity of
confidential relationships. Fiduciary obligation is the highest order of
duty imposed by law. In the relationship with the principal, the benefici-
ary of the relationship, the fiduciary must exercise utmost good faith and
candor, must disclose all relevant information, and must not profit from
the relationship without the knowledge and permission of the principal.
The fiduciary must make every effort to avoid having his own interests
conflict with those of the principal, and, when conflict is unavoidable, the
fiduciary must place the interests of the principal above his own. These
principles are both basic and uncompromising. Cardozo trenchantly ex-
pressed the matter as follows:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties.
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most
sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has de-
veloped a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromis-
ing rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned
ing dominance as the implicit result. See In re Estate of Beal, 769 P.2d at 155 ("In each
case [finding a confidential relationship] we have looked at the facts and found a relation-
ship which would allow a reasonably prudent person to repose confidence in the other.");
Capriulo v. Bankers Life Co., 344 S.E.2d 430, 432 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) ("The showing of a
relationship in fact which justifies the reposing of confidence by one party in another is all
the law requires.").
3. See Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 285,
301 (1989) (footnotes omitted):
The question-who is a fiduciary?-is answered very simply or only after a
detailed examination of the facts. It is simply answered if the relationship
falls within the nominate categories deemed to be fiduciary .... Other rela-
tionships may exceptionally involve a trust equivalent to or stronger than
even the closest relationship between, for example, a solicitor and a client
.... These are 'fact-based' fiduciary relationships.
4. And vice versa. See Fipps v. Stidham, 50 P.2d 680, 683 (Okla. 1935) ("Confidential
and fiduciary relations are in law synonymous, and exist whenever trust and confidence is
reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.").
2000]
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to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating
erosion" of particular exceptions .... Only thus has the level of
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden
by the crowd.5
The proposition of placing the interests of another on par with-or
even in ascendancy to- one's own is so extraordinary to human experi-
ence that it is both understandable and laudable that law and equity have
been most reticent to impose the obligation. Its imposition has been re-
served to a handful of formal fiduciary relationships and to the occasional
confidential relationship. Notwithstanding the narrowness of this reserva-
tion, the courts have, nevertheless, painted their descriptions of confiden-
tial relationships most broadly. There is good reason for this given the
extraordinary variety of illicit human conduct. The purpose is to cast the
net broadly but to limit the "catch" to only the most deserving of situa-
tions.6 For this reason, determining the existence of a confidential rela-
tionship must always be intensely fact-based. But it is only the most
extraordinary of fact patterns that will give rise to a finding of a confiden-
tial relationship. 7 The onerous nature of fiduciary obligation necessitates
5. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
6. See Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d 792, 798 (Colo. 1979) ("confidential relationship may
arise from a multitude of circumstances"); Egr v. Egr, 131 P.2d 198, 201 (Or. 1942) ("Eq-
uity will never bind itself by any hard and fast definition of the phrase confidential rela-
tion"); In re Null's Estate, 153 A. 137, 139 (Pa. 1930) ("No precise language can define the
limits of the [confidential relationship]"); Robinson v. Robinson, 517 S.W.2d 202, 206
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1974) (confidential relationship can assume a variety of forms and thus
courts have been reluctant to define such relationships precisely); Castaldo v. Castaldo,
No. SPBR 9412-28656, 1995 WL 476798, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 12, 1995) ("There is
no bright line test as to what is or is not a special or confidential relationship . . . . 'But
equity has carefully restrained from defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and
in such a manner as to exclude new situations."', quoting Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn.
218, 225 (1955)); Weisblatt v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 371 (E.D. Pa.
1998) ("It is impossible to define precisely what constitutes a confidential relation," quot-
ing 3 GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482 at 86 (1946):
"Equity will never bind itself by any hard and fast definition of the phrase 'confidential
relation"'); United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he common
law has in fact always defined [confidential relationship] with deliberate imprecision and
perhaps surprising expansiveness" (quoting Coffee, From Tort to Crime, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 117, 150 (1981))).
Similarly, the law defines fraud broadly. The reason has been wonderfully stated as
follows:
Fraud is kaleidoscopic, infinite. Fraud being infinite and taking on protean
form at will, were courts to cramp themselves by defining it with a hard and
fast definition, their jurisdiction would be cunningly circumvented at once by
new schemes beyond the definition. Messieurs, the fraud-feasors, would like
nothing half so well as for courts to say they would go thus far, and no fur-
ther in its pursuit. Accordingly definitions of fraud are of set purpose left
general and flexible, and thereto courts match their astuteness against the
versatile inventions of fraud-doers.
Stonemets v. Head, 154 S.W. 108, 114 (Mo. 1913) (citations omitted).
7. A "confidential relationship" is, however, readily distinguishable from a "special
relationship" that will give rise only to a tort duty of good faith and fair dealing. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) provides: "Every contract imposes upon each
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." A
similar provision is codified by § 1-203 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. Over the
past quarter century, a great deal of litigation across the country has addressed the issues
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that it will not be lightly imposed.
II. THE NATURE OF CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS
When justification exists for reposing the extraordinary trust and confi-
dence that gives rise to a confidential relationship, the reason is usually
apparent and persuasive. Unless the facts sustaining the alleged justifica-
tion are themselves in controversy, there is little function for the trier of
fact in these clear-cut confidential relationship cases except to validate
the trial judge's own unspoken assessment. Given the extraordinary bur-
den of fiduciary obligation, it is understandable for the trial judge to want
her own assessment validated by the jury. Thus, many clear-cut confiden-
tial relationship cases probably go to trial on the issue even though in
retrospect they could have been decided by summary judgment. It is only
in cases in which the evidence that would sustain the alleged relationship
is controverted, or in which the reasonableness of the trust and confi-
dence allegedly reposed is at issue, that the jury should play a key role in
determining the existence of a confidential relationship or lack thereof.
Regardless, far too many cases go to trial on the issue when the factual
allegations, even if uncontroverted, do not support the relationship. The
issue should have been decided by the trial court by summary judgment.
This is apparent from reading the plethora of appellate-level decisions
sustaining a trial court's correction of its own error by entering a judg-
ment notwithstanding a jury's finding of a confidential relationship, or
of when the duty of good faith arises and the parameters of the duty when it does arise.
Much of the litigation has centered on employment and franchise contract cases, as well as
contracts covered by the Uniform Commercial Code. Helpful analyses of this developing
area of the law may be found in: Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common
Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Steven J. Burton, Good
Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1981); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967);
Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: ime for a Statute, 62
VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666 (1963); Rob-
ert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968). Many courts have limited the good
faith obligation to contracts in which there is a "special relationship" between the parties, a
relationship that gives rise only to obligations of good faith and fair dealing, but not to the
full panorama of fiduciary duties. A leading case is English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521
(Tex. 1983). One court succinctly distinguished the fiduciary obligations arising from "con-
fidential relationships" from the good faith duty arising from "special relationships" as
follows:
Although a fiduciary duty encompasses at the very minimum a duty of good
faith and fair dealing, the converse is not true. The duty of good faith and
fair dealing merely requires the parties to 'deal fairly' with one another and
does not encompass the often more onerous burden that requires a party to
place the interest of the other party before his own, often attributed to a
fiduciary duty.
Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Co., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992).
The fiduciary obligation arising from a confidential relationship will always encompass the




where, even worse, the appellate court has reversed a trial court's affir-
mation of the jury's verdict. The natural reaction is to question why the
issue ever went to trial and why the trouble, time and expense of trial and
appeal were not avoided early on. The reason, in part, is undoubtedly
attributable to the broad doctrinal strokes used by our courts in describ-
ing the nature of a confidential relationship.
These matters are well illustrated by the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Texas in Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swanson.8
This was a suit by the Swansons alleging that Schlumberger had misrepre-
sented the value of a joint venture to mine diamonds when it bought out
the Swansons' interest in the venture. Schlumberger defended on the ba-
sis of a claims release signed by the Swansons as part of the buy-out
agreement. The Swansons sought to invalidate the release alleging, inter
alia, that a confidential relationship existed between the Swansons and
Schlumberger and that the latter had violated its fiduciary duties by mak-
ing misrepresentations regarding the value of the venture and by failing
to disclose the true value. However, the Swansons presented no evidence
of any prior fiduciary relationship between the parties or of any other
basis for a finding of a confidential relationship, other than their own
subjective trust in Schlumberger. Nevertheless, the trial court allowed
the issue of a confidential relationship to go to the jury, and the jury
found in favor of the relationship. The trial court then entered judgment
notwithstanding the jury's verdict. The trial court's judgment was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court of Texas. But even so, in its affirmation the
court described the nature of a confidential relationship with the typically
broad language:
An informal relationship may give rise to a fiduciary duty where one
person trusts in and relies on another, whether the relation is a
moral, social, domestic, or purely personal one. But not every rela-
tionship involving a high degree of trust and confidence rises to the
stature of a fiduciary relationship. In order to give full force to con-
tracts, we do not create such a relationship lightly.9
In determining the issue, the second two sentences in the Court's state-
ment are more important than the first. However, it is understandable
that a lay jury would not so perceive the matter were it so instructed. The
jury obviously did believe that the Swansons trusted Schlumberger. Busi-
ness associates as a rule do trust one another; it is often a core reason
they have chosen to do business. However, it is one thing to trust some-
one to deal honestly and quite another to trust someone to put one's
interests above his own. Extraordinary facts are necessary to make this
latter kind of trust plausible and reasonable.' 0 The Swansons simply
8. 959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997).
9. Id. at 176-77 (citations omitted).
10. Undoubtedly, error could often be avoided were trial courts to instruct juries along
these lines, but they apparently typically do not. See Hoover v. Cooke, 566 S.W.2d 19, 27
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[T]he tendency of the courts is to
construe the facts presented liberally in favor of the confider against the confidant in deter-
[Vol. 53
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS
presented no facts that would justify unbridled faith and confidence in
Schlumberger. But little in the court's description would have alerted the
uninitiated jurors to make this fine distinction.
It is not only the sweeping language used by the courts in describing
confidential relationships that causes confusion in determining their exist-
ence, but also the various overlapping bases for invoking equity jurisdic-
tion and the disparate reasons resort to that jurisdiction is sought. During
the first half of this century, our courts began to extend the availability of
equitable remedies beyond the traditional cases involving breach of a for-
mal or informal fiduciary obligation to include almost any kind of case in
which a wrongdoer had profited from illicit conduct. These cases repre-
sented an extension of the customary legal restitutionary remedy of quasi
contract in that they allowed use of equity's tracing mechanisms to follow
the money or property wrongfully taken into its proceeds. The equitable
remedies of constructive trust and equitable lien could then be used
against those proceeds for the purpose of ensuring that the wrongdoer
did not profit from his wrong. The result of this extension of equity juris-
diction was to blur for all time the historical distinction between the legal
remedy of quasi contract and the equitable remedies of equitable lien
and, particularly, constructive trust. In time, many courts began to erase
entirely the distinction by holding that plaintiffs were entitled to the rem-
edy of constructive trust or equitable lien in cases in which there was no
breach of a formal or informal fiduciary obligation, nor any other wrong
by the defendant other than having acquired money or property of the
plaintiff with no legitimate reason for retaining it." Equity had invaded
mining whether a confidential relationship exists .... ."); Peckham v. Johnson, 98 S.W.2d
408, 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1936) (a confidential relationship includes "every
form of relation between parties wherein confidence is reposed by one in another, and he
relies and acts upon the representations of the other and is guilty of no derelictions on his
own part"), affid, 120 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1938); Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 143
N.E. 482, 484 (Ill. 1924) (confidential relationship "exists in all cases in which influence has
been acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed. The origin
of the confidence is immaterial. It may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.");
Hoge v. George, 200 P. 96, 102 (Wyo. 1921) (test for confidential relationship is whether
"there was confidence reposed on the one side and accepted on the other, with a resulting
dependence by the one party and influence by the other.").
The following broad jury instruction is apparently typical in confidential relationship
cases: "You are instructed that the term 'confidential relationship,' as used above, means a
relationship where one person trusts and relies on another, whether the relationship is
moral, social, domestic, merely a personal one, or grows out of a family situation." Ham-
blet v. Coveney, 714 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
In fick v. Miller, 483 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.), the
trial court instructed the jury that by a confidential relationship: ".... . is meant every form
of relationship between parties wherein confidence and special trust is reposed by one in
another and he or she is justified in placing such trust and confidence in such other party,
and relies upon such other party to protect his or her interest." Id. at 905-06.
11. For a discussion of the erosion of the boundaries between law and equity with
respect to the remedies of quasi contract and constructive trust, see 1 GEORGE E. PALMER,
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.4 (1978); see also Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256 (Tex.
1951) (emphasis added):
2000]
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the former exclusive province of quasi contract. 12 In these cases, for the
practical purpose of disgorging an unjust enrichment, quasi contract and
constructive trust were treated synonymously. A similar development
has occurred in unjust enrichment cases where the plaintiff has alleged,
perhaps as an alternative means of redress, the abuse by the defendant of
a confidential relationship with the plaintiff. Thus, it is not uncommon to
find cases in which the court finds in favor of the existence of a confiden-
tial relationship to disgorge an unjust enrichment without analysis of the
facts supporting the relationship, and, indeed, where the evidence does
not support it.
In this same vein, the Restatement of Restitution suggests that, where a
transferee of property orally agrees to hold the property for the trans-
feror or to return it on demand, "there is in this very fact a sufficient
relation of confidence thereby created to justify imposing a constructive
While a confidential or fiduciary relationship does not in itself give rise to a
constructive trust, an abuse of confidence rendering the acquisition or reten-
tion of property by one person unconscionable against another suffices gen-
erally to ground equitable relief in the form of the declaration and
enforcement of a constructive trust, and the courts are careful not to limit the
rule or the scope of its application by a narrow definition of fiduciary or confi-
dential relationships protected by it.
Id. at 261 (quoting 54 AM. JUR. TRUSTS § 225 (1961)) (emphasis added).
12. For a very helpful little book that traces, with regret, the expansion of equity juris-
diction over the first half of this century, see JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(1951). Regarding the use of constructive trust in cases where a money judgment at law
based on quasi contract would have served just as well, Professor Dawson opined: "With-
out much conscious purpose or plan we have created this shambling creature. It is time to
fence it in." Id. at 33; see also In re Goldberg, 168 B.R. 382, 384 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)
(under California law, a wrongful act giving rise to constructive trust need not amount to
fraud or intentional misrepresentation; all that must be shown is that acquisition of prop-
erty was wrongful and that defendant's keeping of property would constitute unjust enrich-
ment); Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A
constructive trust may be invoked even where the unjustly enriched party is completely
blameless."), overruled on other grounds by Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d
575 (7th Cir. 1992); Zeigler v. Cardona, 830 F. Supp. 1395, 1398-99 (M.D. Ala. 1993)
(under Alabama law, "[a] constructive trust may be imposed on life insurance proceeds
even though the designated beneficiary is not guilty of fraud or wrongdoing ... construc-
tive trust may be imposed to prevent unjust enrichment, without regard to actual fraud.");
Adams v. Jankouskas, 452 A.2d 148, 152 (Del. 1982) (holding that a constructive trust is
imposed when defendant's conduct "causes him to be unjustly enriched at the expense of
another to whom he owed some duty."); Fuller v. Fuller, 606 P.2d 306, 309-10 (Wyo. 1980)
(constructive trust is imposed to prevent unjust enrichment and may arise even though
acquisition of property was not wrongful); Easterling v. Ferris, 651 P.2d 677, 680 (Okla.
1982) ("The primary reason for imposing constructive trust is to avoid unjust enrichment
against" party who holds property which he ought not to hold); Annon v. Lucas, 185 S.E.2d
343, 352 (W. Va. 1971) (constructive trust imposed even though property was originally
acquired without fraud or wrongdoing so as to avoid unjust enrichment); Hercules v. Jones,
609 A.2d 837, 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("The controlling factor in determining whether a
constructive trust should be imposed is whether it is necessary to prevent unjust enrich-
ment."); Spiess v. Schumm, 448 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (constructive trust
may be imposed when it is necessary to avoid unjust enrichment, and wrongdoing by party
holding property is not necessary). Although imposing the equitable remedy of a construc-
tive trust to prevent unjust enrichment, notwithstanding the lack of wrongdoing, is perhaps
a developing trend in the law, most cases do continue to require additionally that the prop-
erty upon which the constructive trust is to be imposed was acquired by fraud or violation
of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
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trust upon him if he breaks his promise."'1 3 In this way, confidential rela-
tionship becomes a surrogate for other bases for invoking equity jurisdic-
tion, such as unjust enrichment, fraud, or other wrong. 14 In many cases,
of course, the fraud or other wrongdoing is coupled with clear evidence of
a confidential relationship. For example, in Tuttlebee v. Tuttlebee,15 a sis-
ter-in-law brought action against her brother-in-law for cancellation of
two deeds. It had been the sister's desire to leave the property to the
defendant upon her death. The brother suggested that she deed the prop-
erty to him and reserve a life estate in herself. He advised her that this
would accomplish her desire and protect his interest in the event that
another family member decided to contest her will. The deeds that he
persuaded her to sign, however, conveyed a full fee simple title to the
brother-in-law. In canceling the deeds, the court found that the brother-
in-law's fraudulent misrepresentation of the effect of the deed wrongfully
denied the sister the opportunity to make a future testamentary disposi-
tion of the property. The court further opined that a confidential rela-
tionship existed between the parties based on his having taken care of her
for three years after the death of her husband by performing work
around the house and acting as her chauffeur. The court emphasized
that, at the time of the conveyance, she was eighty-two years of age, had
poor eyesight, and was otherwise physically infirm.
Finally, a curious anomaly deserves mention. The fiduciary obligation
sought to be imposed may itself be determinative of whether a confiden-
tial relationship will be found to exist. On identical facts pertaining to the
relationship, a court may find a confidential relationship for the purpose
13. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION, QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS § 182 cmt. c (1937) (comment on clause (b)) (emphasis added). Clause (b)
provides:
Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter vivos to another
upon an oral trust in favor of the transferor or upon an oral agreement to
reconvey the land to the transferor, and the trust or agreement is unenforce-
able because of the Statute of Frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform
the trust or agreement, he holds the interest upon a constructive trust for the
transferor, if... (b) the transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confi-
dential relation to the transferor.
Id. § 182(b).
The Comment does, however, candidly admit that "some courts require additional evi-
dence of confidence in the relation between them before imposing a constructive trust. Id.
§ 182 cmt. c.
14. A case in point is Rumfield v. Rumfield, 324 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In that case, an 80-year-old illiterate man unwittingly
deeded land to his nephew after the nephew told him he was only signing a will that was
completely revokable. The court granted a judgment for cancellation of the deed, a rem-
edy clearly justifiable at law for fraud in factum. See id. at 306. Nevertheless, the courtjustified its decision instead on the basis of a confidential relationship between the uncle
and nephew. The court pointed to the testimony of several disinterested parties stating
that after visiting the uncle for only a short period of time in the hospital, the nephew was
able to persuade him knowingly to sign a will and a permit to allow the nephew to write
checks on his bank account, as well as to sign the deed unknowingly. See id. at 307. This
evidence, however, speaks directly to only the wrongdoing of the nephew and, only by
strained implication, to his relationship to his uncle.
15. 702 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
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of disgorging unjust enrichment whereas it would find against such a rela-
tionship if the plaintiff has not been enriched but some other reason is
presented for invoking equity, such as shifting the burden of proof to the
defendant 16 or avoiding the statute of frauds17 or the parol evidence
rule.18
III. LIMITATIONS ON CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS
Before turning to an examination of the kinds of relationships recog-
nized by the courts as giving rise to fiduciary obligations, three limitations
on establishing a fact-based fiduciary relationship deserve mention. First,
the alleged relationship must be found to have existed prior to the trans-
action at issue. Second, the reliance by the aggrieved party that the other
would act toward him as a fiduciary must not have been merely subjec-
tive. Third, the alleged confidential relationship may not be established
solely by private agreement, but must arise sui generis from the nature of
the relationship. Each of these limitations engrafted by the courts is sen-
sible and will be examined in turn.19
16. It is, for example, a basic principle of equity that a fiduciary has the burden of
showing the fairness of his transactions with the beneficiary. See Frowen v. Blank, 425
A.2d 412, 418 (Pa. 1981) (confidential relationship between vendor and purchaser at time
agreement was executed shifted to purchaser burden of proving transfer was fair); Texas
Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1980); Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d
256 (Tex. 1951); Consolidated Bearing & Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 720 S.W.2d 647
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ); Tuttlebee, 702 S.W.2d 253; Miller v. Miller, 700
S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Guerrieri v. Guerrieri, 301 N.E.2d
603, 605 (III. App. Ct. 1973) (where confidential relationship exists, burden falls on grantee
to show fairness of transaction).
17. An oral promise by a fiduciary may be enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of
Frauds. See Silver v. Silver, 219 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1966); Jarnagin v. Busby, Inc., 867 P.2d
63, 67 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Dodson v. Kung, 717 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 182 (1937).
18. See Linder v. Citizens State Bank of Malakoff, 528 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the jury's
verdict finding a confidential relationship for purposes of avoiding the parol evidence
rule). Linder is a good example of a case that should not have gone to trial on the issue of
a confidential relationship. The plaintiff alleged such a relationship between himself and a
bank with which he had never had any business transactions, not even a bank account.
Further, there was no allegation of fraud or unjust enrichment against the bank. Compare
Schiller v. Elick, 240 S.W.2d 997, 1000 (Tex. 1951) (parole evidence rule will not bar evi-
dence to prove existence of fiduciary relationship).
19. An anomaly that is in no sense a limitation on the parameters of confidential rela-
tionships deserves mention. Although there is nothing conceptually inelegant in framing a
cause of action in terms of a breach of a confidential relationship, anymore than as a
breach of a fiduciary relationship, some jurisdictions specifically deny the existence of
either as an independent cause. See Todd Holding Co., Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 874
P.2d 402, 404 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) ("confidential relationship is merely an element in
establishing a fiduciary relationship or some type of fiduciary duty;" "[A] confidential rela-
tionship may be an element of other causes of action but a breach of confidential relation-
ship is not a cause of action in and of itself."); First Nat'l Bank of Meeker v. Theos, 794
P.2d 1055, 1061 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) ("[E]xistence of a confidential relationship is simply
one of the elements to be considered in determining whether there is fraud, undue influ-
ence, overreaching, or other improper conduct."). Regardless, even in jurisdictions that
have not addressed the issue, the courts do not customarily speak of breach of a confiden-
tial relationship as an independent cause of action. The cause is usually couched in terms
of the equitable remedy sought-such as an action to impose a constructive trust or equita-
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS
A. RELATIONSHIP MUST EXIST PRIOR TO AND APART FROM THE
TRANSACTION AT ISSUE
The courts uniformly hold that the alleged confidential relationship
must be established on facts existing prior to and apart from the transac-
tion in question.20 Interestingly enough, the limitation is invariably stated
as a self-evident truism and is unaccompanied by comment, explanation
or discussion. Perhaps the limitation is obvious; it certainly is sensible.
The gist of the aggrieved party's allegation is that the transaction at issue
is tainted because he had a reasonable expectation that the other party
would act toward him as a fiduciary. If the focus for the reasonableness
of that expectation is entirely on the transaction at issue, then the allega-
tion necessarily is based on status; i.e., the relationship of the parties aris-
ing from the transaction. What is there about the transaction that would
cause the aggrieved party reasonably to believe that the other would as-
sume fiduciary obligations toward him? If the answer is the transaction
itself, then the aggrieved party is simply arguing that, because of the na-
ture of the transaction, the other party should, as a matter of law, hold
the status of a fiduciary. Formal fiduciary relationships arise as a matter
of law based on the status of the parties. Conversely, informal confiden-
tial relationships, and the accompanying fiduciary obligation, are deter-
mined from the unique facts pertaining to the parties' particular
relationship, and that relationship must necessarily precede the transac-
tion at issue.
Further, the aggrieved party must always assert justifiable detrimental
reliance on the other party's obligation to act as a fiduciary. But the as-
serted reliance always, indeed by necessity, takes the form of his having
entered into the transaction at issue. The transaction is the reliance, and
its reasonableness must therefore be based on facts existing prior thereto.
Since the transaction itself is the event that constitutes the reliance neces-
ble lien, or for an accounting, or to set aside a deed-or in terms of a wrong more specific
than the breach of the relationship-such as fraud (actual or constructive) undue influence,
failure to disclose, or unjust enrichment. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Smith, 779 S.W.2d 384, 388
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (describing confidential relationship as a frequently used basis for
demonstrating undue influence sufficient to invalidate a will). The courts' reluctance to
accept the violation of the relationship as the cause of action is both anomalous and con-
fusing because the essence of the wrong, regardless of the remedy sought, is the breach of a
confidential relationship. A current issue of debate is whether an attorney should be liable
to his client independently for breach of a fiduciary duty when the usual causes of action
for malpractice or breach of contract are not available. See Roy R. Anderson & Walter W.
Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47
SMU L. REV. 235 (1994) (arguing in favor of an independent cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty by attorneys).
20. See Apple v. Apple, 95 N.E.2d 334, 338 (Ill. 1950) (no confidential relationship
where any influence or superiority was not obtained prior to the transaction at issue);
Vikell Investors Pacific, Inc. v. Kip Hampden, Ltd., 946 P.2d 589, 597 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997)
(allegation of confidential relationship failed where there was no pre-existing relationship
of trust between the parties); Capriulo v. Bankers Life Co., 344 S.E.2d 430, 433 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986) ("[A] confidential relationship does not exist prior to the contract or legal
relationship creating it, unless it exists for other reasons." (quoting Cole v. Cates, 149
S.E.2d 165, 168 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966))).
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sary to establish injury, it cannot logically also be the event that precipi-
tates reliance.2' The party asserting the relationship cannot use the
reliance itself as a bootstrap for its reasonableness.
What is unclear and questionable is the "apart from" element of the
limitation. The courts invariably frame the limitation in terms of the rela-
tionship being both "prior to" and "apart from" the transaction at issue.
Taken at face value, this might indicate that negotiations preliminary to
the transaction could not be used to establish the confidential relation-
ship. A literal reading of the restriction is, hopefully, unintended. To
exclude absolutely preliminary negotiations from the mix of circum-
stances used to establish the confidential relationship would be unwise.
For example, to take a clear case, if one party in negotiations, expressly or
by rational implication, voluntarily assumes a fiduciary role, such as that
of a trustee, surely this fact, even though not arising apart from the trans-
action, would be both relevant and conclusive as to the reasonableness of
the aggrieved party's expectation.22 No court to date has directly ad-
dressed the issue of the ostensible dichotomy of "prior to" and "apart
from." Perhaps each element is taken to be synonymous and the "apart
from" portion is merely redundant. The party asserting the relationship,
then, may use all facts existing prior to the transaction, including prelimi-
nary negotiations, to establish the relationship. Alternatively, perhaps
negotiations are to be considered as sufficiently "apart from" the ensuing
transaction to satisfy the requirement.
Although the facts establishing the confidential relationship must be
based on those in existence prior to the transaction at issue, the length of
the relationship is not of itself determinative.2 3 A leading case on point is
Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar International Transportation
21. A prior fiduciary relationship between the parties, standing alone, may be insuffi-
cient to establish a confidential relationship between them even as to similar subsequent
transactions. See Evertson v. Cannon, 411 N.W.2d 612, 626 (Neb. 1987) (prior dealings
between parties coupled with the fact that one party subjectively trusts the other does not
establish a confidential relationship). In Evertson, plaintiff and defendant were joint ven-
turers under a farmout agreement for the drilling of an oil well on certain acreage. De-
fendant later acquired oil leases on the same acreage for purposes of drilling other wells.
Plaintiff sued to establish a constructive trust on the new leases alleging a confidential
relationship with defendant. In finding for defendant, the court held that no confidential
relationship existed between the parties as to the acquisition of the leases at issue because
the prior fiduciary relationship between the parties extended only to dealings within that
relationship. See id. at 627.
22. For an example of such a situation, see supra text accompanying note 13.
23. See Harris v. Sentry Title Co., Inc., 727 F.2d 1368, 1369 (5th Cir. 1984) (lengthy
duration of prior relationship is but one factor to consider in determining confidential rela-
tionship); Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex, Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1038 (4th Cir.
1997) (business relationship of long and cordial duration insufficient standing alone to es-
tablish confidential relationship); see also Maguire v. Holcomb, 523 N.E. 2d 688 (I11. Ct.
App. 1988), (a fiduciary relationship did not exist between buyers and sellers of a restau-
rant based upon long social acquaintance of one buyer with sellers and a student-advisor
relationship between another buyer and one of the sellers some five years prior to the
transaction at issue), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 248 (Ill. 1988); Winston v. Lake Jackson
Bank, 574 S.W.2d 628, 628-29 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ) (claim




Corp.,24 involving an action by a franchisee against its franchisor of a
trucking franchise. The Supreme Court of Texas determined that no con-
fidential relationship existed between the parties even though their busi-
ness relationship under the contract had lasted for over forty years. The
lengthy relationship had certainly developed into one in which the parties
reposed in each other a mutual trust and confidence. But there was, how-
ever, no independent evidence in the trial record that the trust and confi-
dence had risen to the level of fiduciary obligation. At best, the
franchisee had merely alleged its own subjective reliance on its relation-
ship with the franchisor.
B. MERE SUBJECTIVE RELIANCE WILL NOT ESTABLISH A
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP
Easily the most common reason given by courts for a refusal to find a
confidential relationship is that "mere subjective trust" of the asserting
party is insufficient to establish the relationship.25 This limitation embod-
ies three important connotations. First, and most obvious, the trust al-
leged by the party asserting the relationship must be both believable and
verifiable from the objective facts. The question is one for the trier of
fact. If the trier does not believe that the party alleging the confidential
relationship placed trust in the alleged fiduciary, the allegation will fail.
Further, a basis for that trust must be shown by objective evidence. The
mere subjective assertion by the claimant is insufficient.
The second connotation of the "mere subjective trust" limitation goes
to the level of trust reposed by the claimant. The claimant must show not
just that he trusted the other party, but that he trusted him to act as a
fiduciary. Further, reposing that level of trust must have been reasonable
under the circumstances. It is the lack of this reasonableness that has
caused so many courts to refuse to find in favor of a confidential relation-
ship. That was ultimately the basis for the court's decision in the previ-
ously mentioned Crim Truck case.26 Despite an ongoing franchise
relationship of over forty years, in which undoubtedly both parties re-
posed trust and confidence in each other, no reasonable basis was demon-
strated by the franchisee for its alleged expectation that the franchisor
would act toward it as a fiduciary.
An early, widely-cited decision emphasizing the higher level of trust
necessary to establish a confidential relationship is that of the Supreme
24. 823 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1992). But see Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. of America v.
Thompson, 405 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. 1966) (a confidential relationship could arise "when,
over a long period of time, the parties ... worked together for the joint acquisition and
development of property previous to the particular agreement sought to be enforced.").
25. Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d at 1038; Crim Truck, 823 S.W.2d at 595; Rankin v. Naftalis,
557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977); Consolidated Gas, 405 S.W.2d at 336; Thigpen v. Locke,
363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962); Landes v. Sullivan, 651 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 416 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.); Consolidated Bearing, 720 S.W.2d at 649; Atrium Boutique v.
Dallas Mkt. Ctr. Co., 696 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
26. Crim Truck, 823 S.W.2d at 591; see supra note 24 and accompanying discussion.
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Court of Texas in Thigpen v. Locke.27 Locke brought suit to set aside two
deeds that conveyed a lot and grocery store to the defendant, Thigpen.
Thigpen was a trust officer of the local bank. Locke owned a grocery
store in which Thigpen bought meat frequently. During the course of
their relationship, Thigpen loaned money to Locke and took the deeds to
the lot and store as a mortgage. The facts revealed that Thigpen was an
officer, director and shareholder of Locke's business and that he often
acted as an advisor to Locke in the management of the grocery store.
The facts further demonstrated that Thigpen and Locke had become
close friends, that Thigpen helped Locke obtain loans, and that he per-
sonally guaranteed one of those loans. Despite all of the foregoing, the
court concluded that no confidential relationship existed between the
parties. Locke had demonstrated no more than a "merely subjective
trust" in Thigpen that did not rise to the level necessary to impose fiduci-
ary obligation. The court said:
Taking the testimony as a whole and most favorably to the respon-
dents, we hold that in this case there is not such evidence of justifi-
able trust and confidence as will create a fiduciary relationship. We
may assume that respondents did trust Mr. Thigpen; they have testi-
fied so time and time again, but mere subjective trust alone is not
enough to transform arm's length dealing into a fiduciary relation-
ship so as to avoid the statute of frauds. Businessmen generally do
trust one another, and their dealings are frequently characterized by
cordiality of the kind testified to here. If we should permit respon-
dents to set aside their conveyances on such slender evidence, the
security of contracts and conveyances in this state would be seriously
jeopardized. 28
There is yet a third connotation implicit in the "mere subjective trust"
limitation. It is essential that the person to be charged with a fiduciary
obligation arising from a confidential relationship be aware that the other
party has that expectation. There is little focus in the case law on this
point, no doubt because the requirement that the claimant demonstrate
by objective evidence that his expectation of the alleged fiduciary was
27. 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1962).
28. Id. at 253; see also Evertson v. Cannon, 411 N.W.2d 612, 626 (Neb. 1987) (fact that
one businessman trusts another is not enough to establish confidential relationship);
Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1977) ("Subjective trust, cordiality and the
trust which prevails between businessmen, which is the foundation of ordinary contract
law, affords no basis for the imposition of an oral trust that thwarts the Statute of
Frauds."); Greater Southwest Office Park, Ltd. v. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 786
S.W.2d 386, 391 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (mere subjective trust
in bank creditor by debtor insufficient to establish confidential relationship so as to prevent
bank from buying loan collateral at "unconscionably" low price at foreclosure sale); Con-
solidated Bearing, 720 S.W.2d at 649 (emphasizing "the distinction between factual proof
of a confidential relationship and mere subjective assertions by one party"); Thomson v.
Norton, 604 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (opining that parties to
a contract usually have some degree of mutual trust and confidence, otherwise they would
not contract with each other); Societe Nationale D'Exploitation Industrielle Des Tabacs Et
Allumettes v. Salomon Bros. Int'l, Ltd., 251 A.D.2d 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (mere sub-




reasonable carries with it the implicit assumption that the party to be
charged has reason to know of the expectation. However, in cases in
which the expectation of the fiduciary is that she engage in or refrain
from conduct of a specific nature, the courts do expressly require that she
have actual or constructive knowledge of that particularized expectation.
The requirement that the alleged fiduciary have actual or constructive
awareness of the claimant's expectation has been aptly labeled the "two-
way street" rule. In Furr's, Inc. v. United Specialty Advertising Co.,2 9
plaintiffs alleged that Furr's had violated a confidential relationship with
plaintiffs by wrongfully divulging a trade secret. The trial court judgment
in favor of the plaintiffs was reversed on appeal. The reversal was based
primarily on the necessity of a confidential relationship being a "two-way
street. '30 Although the trial record clearly supported plaintiffs' asser-
tions that they had utmost confidence in Furr's and relied on their integ-
rity, there was no showing that Furr's was made aware at any time that
the trade secret was disclosed to Furr's in confidence. Other cases have
made reference to the "two-way street" rule merely to emphasize the un-
fairness in finding a confidential relationship where, notwithstanding a
history of a prior business relationship based on trust and confidence, the
parties had always conducted their affairs at arm's length.31 In these
cases the application of the rule only emphasizes the lack of objective
verification of the reasonableness of the claimant's subjective
expectation.
C. A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP MAY NOT BE ESTABLISHED (OR
BARRED) BY PRIVATE AGREEMENT
As a general rule, equity jurisdiction may be neither invoked nor
barred by private agreement. 32 The primary function of equity is to tailor
a remedy to achieve justice where the customary application of rules of
law prove inadequate to the task. Our courts have historically retained
extraordinary discretion in determining whether or not equity will inter-
vene. Accordingly, it is understandable that notions of freedom of con-
tract will not be allowed to usurp that discretion. To date, apparently
only one court has addressed the issue of whether a contract provision
claiming that it was a "personal agreement involving mutual confidence
29. 385 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1964, writ ref d n.r.e.).
30. Id. at 459.
31. See, e.g., Hoover v. Cooke, 566 S.W.2d 19, 26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, writ reh'g n.r.e.) ("A 'confidential relationship' is a 'two-way' street; one party must
not only trust the other, but the relationship must be mutual and understood by both par-
ties .... "); see also Jarnagin v. Busby, Inc., 867 P.2d 63, 67 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (to
establish confidential relationship there must be proof that "either the reposing of trust
and confidence in the other party was justified, or the party in whom such confidence was
reposed either invited, ostensibly accepted, or acquiesced in such trust ... ").
32. See generally R. ANDERSON, DAMAGES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 13.11 (1988).
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and trust" established a confidential relationship between the parties. 33
The court ruled that it did not. However, although never determinative,
such an agreement would certainly be relevant in context with other sup-
porting evidence to establish a confidential relationship. At the very
least, it could help demonstrate that one party's assertion of the relation-
ship was not merely subjective.
A contract provision denying the existence of a confidential relation-
ship, on the other hand, when in fact such a relationship did exist, should
always be invalid and unenforceable. It would, in effect, represent a dis-
claimer of fiduciary liability which, under the familiar rule everywhere, is
void as against public policy.
IV. CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS: A
CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS
Unlike formal fiduciary relationships, confidential relationships are not
based on status. They are, instead, fact-based. Yet, the complexities and
vagaries of human relationships are so infinitely varied and confusingly
overlapping that the mind boggles when trying to make useful distinc-
tions among them. The temptation to generalize is thus irresistible. Un-
derstandably, then, the courts often speak in terms of categories in
determining the existence of confidential relationships. Across a contin-
uum from, at one end, family relationships, through others, such as close
personal (or "family-like") relationships and friendships, to, at the other
end, business and arm's length relationships, the courts fashion the pige-
onholes for sorting the facts of a particular case.
Any discussion of the issue of confidential relationship must begin with
a general description of its nature. Was it familial or merely arm's length
or something in between? From the answer, certain broad, but not un-
helpful, generalizations can be made. If the core essence of confidential
relationship is justifiable reliance by the beneficiary on the bona fides of
the fiduciary, and it is, then in familial or family-like situations little evi-
dence sustaining reliance will be necessary to establish the required rela-
tionship. Conversely, if we move to the other end of the spectrum, to
business and arm's length situations, persuasive and compelling evidence
will be required for a finding of a confidential relationship.
But an important caveat is necessary. The generalizations are nothing
more. The categories do not convey status. They cover the spectrum of
human interaction. Not all marriages are made in heaven-or hell. Not
all mothers love their daughters, nor sons trust their fathers. "Friend-
ship," even "close personal friendship," defies concrete connotation.
33. Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591 n.7 (Tex.
1992). The provision read in pertinent part as follows: "This is a personal agreement, in-
volving mutual confidence and trust, and it may not be assigned by either party without the
written consent of the other party ... " d. at 595. The court construed the intent of the




One can enjoy another's companionship, even intensely so, without con-
veying to the other trust and confidence. Business associations, even
arm's length ones, can develop over time to transcend the absence of kin-
ship and friendship and to nurture a high level of trust and confidence.
It's just that the further the move down the continuum from familial to
arm's length relationships, the greater the need for persuasive evidence to
sustain the plausibility of the assertion that the one party was justified in
placing his reliance in the other to treat the one's interest at least on par
with the other's own. An analysis of the cases by category supports this
conclusion.
A. FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIPS
Of Oral Trusts and Dependent Plight
The term "familial" in the present discussion is used advisedly to refer
to associations with members of one's own core family unit, as well as
with persons related by blood or marriage. It is with members of this
group of people that one will most understandably repose the level of
trust and confidence that will give rise to a confidential relationship in the
eyes of equity. In turn, it is this category that represents the saddest of
cases. It is one thing to deal sharply or dishonestly with a mere acquain-
tance. It is quite another to violate the trust of a member of one's own
family. It is an unhappy commentary that such cases are common in the
reported decisions.
From the familial relationship cases two generalizations unfold. First, a
familial relationship does not automatically give rise to the status of a
confidential, fiduciary relationship.34 Second, in familial situations a con-
fidential relationship is comparatively easy to prove. If the alleged fiduci-
ary is guilty of wrongful conduct leading to illicit gain, the courts often
find in favor of the required relationship without discussion. Although I
am familiar with no case so putting the matter, there is a virtual rebutta-
ble presumption in favor of confidential relationships in many familial
situations.35 Several jurisdictions, however, profess to subject dealings
34. See Halle v. Summerfield, 287 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tenn. 1956) (relations between fam-
ily members and relatives are not, in and of themselves, confidential relationships); Tut-
tlebee v. Tuttlebee, 702 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ)
("Neither a family relationship nor the mere fact of bestowing benefits establishes a fiduci-
ary relationship."); Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1980) (standing
alone, the relation of aunt and nephew does not establish a confidential relationship);
Guerrieri v. Guerrieri, 301 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (mere relationship of parent and
child does not create confidential relationship as matter of law); Anaya v. Estrada, 447
S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969) (no confidential relationship between brothers
and sisters); Apple v. Apple, 95 N.E.2d 334 (Ill. 1950) (mere fact of family relation does
not create fiduciary relationship as matter of law); Allen v. Jones, 110 P.2d 911 (Okla.
1941) (no confidential relationship between parent and adult child).
35. The past quarter century has seen a dramatic expansion in the rights of married
women. Today the law everywhere is that their rights are equal to those of their husbands.
Previously, when the law made women subservient to their husbands, even with respect to
dealing with their own property, the presumption was that the husband owed to his wife a
fiduciary duty in business transactions with her and with third parties when the transac-
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between spouses to no different treatment.36 Nevertheless, unlike with
formal fiduciary relationships, the obligations attendant to familial fidu-
ciary relationships may be rebutted. It is quite natural to presume that an
abiding trust and confidence will be placed in members of one's family,
and it is thus fair to require a showing of the unreasonableness of the
presumption in a particular case. What is it that taints this particular rela-
tionship that would make the customary interaction of family members
inappropriate? 37 The cornerstone of a confidential relationship is objec-
tively verifiable and justifiable reliance. That kind of reliance is com-
monly part of close family relationships. Good reason needs to be shown
when it is not.
Indeed where the relational bond is obviously inherently strong, such
as parent to child or one spouse to another, the tendency of the courts is
tions involved the wife's property. The changes in the law regarding women's rights have
caused many jurisdictions to invalidate the presumption and to hold that the marriage rela-
tionship is not per se a fiduciary one. See Tedesco v. Tedesco, 683 A.2d 1133 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1996) (state statute giving equality of rights to men and women invalidated former
presumption that husband was fiduciary of wife; "Unlike many jurisdictions, Maryland
does not presume the existence of a confidential relationship in transactions between hus-
band and wife." Id. at 1144). See also Bell v. Bell, 501 A.2d 817 (Md. 1985) (common law
presumption that husband was dominant figure in marriage no longer valid).
Nevertheless, the common law presumption has been replaced in many jurisdictions with
a standard of close scrutiny of transactions between spouses so that the results in the cases
represent little, if any, change, other than perhaps to impose upon the wife a standard of
dealing formerly only imposed on the husband. In Tedesco, the court subscribed to the
following description of the current attitude:
Generally, however, on account of the natural dominance of the husband
over the wife, and the confidence and trust usually incident to their marriage,
a court of equity will investigate a gift from a wife to her husband with ut-
most care, especially where it strips her of all her property; and the burden of
proof is on the husband to show that there was no abuse of confidence, but
that the gift was fair in all respects, was fully understood, and was not in-
duced by fraud or undue influence.
Tedesco, 683 A.2d at 1144 (quoting Manos v. Papachrist, 86 A.2d 474, 476 (Md. 1951)).
Many jurisdictions, however, continue to hold that marriage creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption of a confidential relationship. See In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D.
1997) (noting that the presumption is that confidential relationship exists between hus-
band and wife and reversing summary judgment against wife in action against deceased
husband's estate to invalidate pre-nuptial agreement); see also In re McKittrick Trust, 865
P.2d 1099 (Mont. 1993) (presumption in favor of confidential relationship between hus-
band and wife was rebutted by the evidence); cf infra note 38.
36. See In re Estate of Tollefsrud, 275 N.W.2d 412, 418 (Iowa 1979) (court inferred "a
legislative intent that commercial dealings between spouses shall be given no different
treatment than those between other parties"); Punelli v. Punelli, 364 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1984) (wife, who asserted confidential relationship between herself and deceased
husband so as to shift from her burden to prove fairness of transactions between them, did
not meet her burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence existence of confidential
relationship where there was no showing that she placed special confidence in husband and
facts indicated that wife had business experience, took active role in management of busi-
ness affairs, and was not dominated by her husband).
37. A showing of a strained relationship or of a lack of trust between family members
should readily rebut the inference of a confidential relationship. In a formal fiduciary rela-
tionship, however, a strained relationship is irrelevant. See Johnson v. Peckham, 120
S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. 1938) ("If the existence of strained relations should be suffered to
work an exception [to the duties of a formal fiduciary], then a designing fiduciary could
easily bring about such relations to set the stage for a sharp bargain.").
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to find a confidential relationship as a matter of law. 38 For example, in
Thames v. Johnson,39 two daughters brought suit against their father and
stepmother to recover damages from the wrongful sale of real property in
which they held an interest with their father. The property had been ob-
tained by the daughters upon the death of their mother as part of the
mother's interest in the community estate. At the time of their mother's
death, the daughters were minors of ten and seven years of age. The
property, however, was not wrongfully sold until some eighteen years
later, by which time the daughters had reached majority. Nevertheless,
the court upheld their claim of constructive fraud for breach of a confi-
dential relationship, stating that "the simple fact of the parent-child rela-
tionship coupled with the girls' youth at the time of their mother's death
confers a duty to uphold a fiduciary relationship. '40 Similarly, in Mathews
v. Mathews,41 the plaintiff and defendant had lived together as husband
and wife for almost twenty-five years. They then discovered that the hus-
band's former marriage was still valid and they were therefore not legally
married. At the time of this unfortunate discovery, the husband was in
the hospital seriously ill. He worried that his legal wife might try to take
his interest in the property from the defendant in event of his death. He
thus deeded their home to the defendant, who promised to reconvey it to
them jointly in the event he got out of the hospital. On these simple facts
the court affirmed the trial court's judgment granting a constructive trust
based on a confidential relationship "as a matter of law."
A study of the familial relationship cases demonstrates that the signifi-
cant majority of them fall within two general fact patterns. Both patterns
reflect a common plight giving rise to dependency in one party and op-
38. A unique line of cases ostensibly presumes a confidential relationship based upon
marriage. In these cases, the relationship between the former spouses is used against an
innocent third party who has no prior relationship with and has done no wrong to the
claimant. The action is typically by the first wife of the deceased against the second to
recover proceeds of a life insurance policy. As part of a property settlement pending di-
vorce, the deceased husband had promised to maintain the life insurance policy in a certain
amount in favor of the first wife and their children. After the husband remarries and
without the knowledge of the former wife, the husband cancels the insurance policy in
breach of the property settlement agreement. The breach is first discovered upon his
death, at which time an insurance policy exists on his life with his current spouse as the
beneficiary. Although there are no proceeds of the canceled policy to trace into the cur-
rent one, and even though the widow has no knowledge of her husband's separation agree-
ment with the claimant, the courts typically grant the former spouse a constructive trust in
the proceeds of the current insurance policy. Little rationale is given to support the result
other than vague reference to the "equitable rights" of the former spouse and children or
the unpersuasive suggestion that the surviving spouse would somehow otherwise be un-
justly enriched. See Hudspeth v. Stoker, 644 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982,
writ ref'd) (focusing on the equitable rights of the former spouse and children); Simonds v.
Simonds, 380 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1978) (suggesting an unjust enrichment of the surviving
spouse).
39. 614 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
40. Id. at 614.
41. 310 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958, no writ); see also Texas Bank &
Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1980) (finding a confidential relationship be-
tween an aunt and nephew as a matter of law). The case is discussed infra note 62.
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portunity leading to avarice in the other.42 In one pattern, the alleged
fiduciary has taken property from the claimant with the promise to recon-
vey it and wrongfully refuses to make the reconveyance. In the second
pattern, the alleged fiduciary has taken advantage of the claimant's plight
to euchre money and property from the claimant. In both patterns, once
the confidential relationship is established, equitable remedies are al-
lowed. In the first, a constructive trust is usually placed on the property
wrongfully withheld. In the second, under the familiar rule, the fiduciary
is required to demonstrate the fairness of the transactions with the disad-
vantaged claimant. Upon his failure to do so, judgment is given in favor
of the claimant, which may include a simple monetary recovery, with or
without punitive damages, or various equitable remedies such as an ac-
counting or a constructive trust.
An early case representative of the first pattern is the decision of the
Supreme Court of Texas in Mills v. Gray.43 This was a suit by a mother
against her son for breach of an oral trust. The mother alleged that cer-
tain real property was conveyed to her son as part of a plan to settle
amicably the community estate of her and her husband. She alleged that
her son agreed to hold the property in trust and to reconvey it to her after
the divorce was finalized. No consideration was given by the son in ex-
change for the property. He denied the existence of the trust and alleged
that he received the property in exchange for his promise to support his
mother as long as she wished. The trial court excluded evidence of the
oral trust from the jury, which in turn found in favor of the son's version
of the oral agreement. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the decision
of the intermediate appellate court reversing the trial court's judgment
and remanding for a new trial. The court reasoned that, even though
42. A budding contention that fits the parameters of this paradigm is currently being
made in family law courts in community property states, such as Texas. The suggestion is
that, based on a special relationship of trust and confidence, the spouse who manages the
community property of the marriage owes broad fiduciary duties to the non-managerial
spouse, including the duty to treat the community at all times favorably to her separate
estate. This priority would, apparently, encompass giving all investment opportunity first
to the community and to pay debt obligations first out of the managing spouse's separate
estate. See Thomas M. Featherston, Jr. & Amy E. Douthitt, Changing the Rules by Agree-
ment: The New Era in Characterization, Management, and Liability of Marital Property, 49
BAYLOR L. REV. 271, 279 (1997) ("The spouse who is managing sole management commu-
nity property can be compared to a trustee."); Bradley R. Adams, Comment, The Doctrine
of Fraud on the Community, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 445,449 (1997) ("The managing spouse is
the fiduciary of the other spouse in the management, control and disposition of special
community property."); see also Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("A trust relationship exists between husband and wife as to
that community property controlled by each spouse."). However, the only case to date
that has directly addressed the issue of enhancing the separate estate at the expense of the
community estate refused to find a fiduciary obligation in the absence of fraud. See Hollo-
way v. Holloway, 671 S.W.2d 51, 59 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ dism'd) ("In engaging in
a new and speculative venture ... a married entrepreneur.., cannot be held guilty of a
breach of fiduciary duty in the absence of evidence of an intent to defraud."); see also
Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998) (rejecting an independent tort claim for
fraud on the community estate by the managing spouse; adequate remedy for fraud on the
community is provided by the statutory rules pertaining to property division upon divorce).
43. 210 S.W.2d 985 (Tex. 1948).
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there was no allegation by the mother of fraud, accident, or mistake, if
her version of the oral agreement were found to be true a constructive
trust should have been granted in her favor based on a confidential rela-
tionship with her son. 44
Where one party expressly agrees to hold property in trust, a confiden-
tial relationship and the accompanying fiduciary obligations arise as a
44. The court relied heavily on 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 44.2, at 451 (4th ed. 1987) which suggests that "numer-
ous cases" support allowing a constructive trust even though the transferee intended to
perform his promise at the time he acquired the property and was thus not guilty of fraud
in acquiring it, and even though he did not take improper advantage of the confidential
relationship in procuring the transfer and was not guilty of undue influence. "The abuse of
the confidential relation in these cases consists merely in his failure to perform his prom-
ise." Id. at 458 The court also quoted favorably from the following analysis in 54 AM. JUR.
§ 233 (1945):
A constructive trust arises where a conveyance is induced on the agreement
of a fiduciary or confidant to hold in trust for a reconveyance or other pur-
pose, where the fiduciary or confidential relationship is one upon which the
grantor justifiably can and does rely and where the agreement is breached,
since the breach of the agreement is an abuse of the confidence, and it is not
necessary to establish such a trust to show fraud or intent not to perform the
agreement when it was made. The tendency of the courts is to construe the
term 'confidence' or 'confidential relationship' liberally in favor of the con-
fider and against the confidant, for the purpose of raising a constructive trust
on a violation or betrayal thereof. A parent and child, grandparent and
child, or brother. and sister relationship is not intrinsically one of confidence,
but under circumstances involves a confidence the abuse of which gives rise
to a constructive trust in accordance with the terms of an agreement or prom-
ise of a grantee to hold in trust or to reconvey.
Id.
In an earlier case, Kidd v. Young, 190 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. 1945), the Supreme Court of Texas
refused to impose a constructive trust on facts almost identical to those in Mills. The oral
promise to reconvey had been made by a son and daughter to their parents. The court
denied admission of parol evidence to establish the agreement to hold the property in trust
because the deed expressed an absolute transfer for consideration. However, there was no
discussion by the court of a confidential relationship between the parties because, presum-
ably, it had not been alleged. The action was simply one at law, not in equity, and the
court's application of the parol evidence rule was thus correct.
Occasionally a court misreads the decision in Kidd by applying its rationale to a breach
of an oral trust by an alleged fiduciary. For example, in Sevine v. Heissner, 220 S.W.2d 704
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1949, no writ rev'd, 224 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1949)), a sister orally
agreed to hold real property for her sister as an equal owner. The property had been
conveyed to her as part of an estate settlement on the advice of her attorney who said it
would facilitate the management and disposition of the property. The court refused to
allow evidence of the oral trust. After discussing both the Kidd and Mills cases, the court
decided to follow Kidd even though it recognized that no confidential relationship issue
had been raised in that case. The court reasoned that the situation before it was more
analogous to Kidd because, as in Kidd, there was contractual consideration expressed in
the deed to the defendant sister, whereas in Mills the deed merely expressed a recital of
consideration. This distinction is, of course, erroneous. The parol evidence rule should
never bar evidence of fraud, because it goes to the enforceability rather than the content of
the writing. An allegation of a breach of an oral agreement by a fiduciary is an allegation
of constructive fraud and, as such, should always be admissible to contravene the enforce-
ability of a writing.
Better-reasoned decisions cite the rule in the Kidd case only after determining that an
alleged confidential relationship did not exist between the parties. Without a confidential
relationship, the constructive fraud claim thus fails and the parol evidence rule becomes
properly applicable. See Anaya v. Estrada, 447 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1969, no writ).
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matter of law. The promisor has voluntarily assumed the status of a fidu-
ciary in the same way that a formal fiduciary, such as a lawyer or doctor,
assumes that status by voluntarily entering into the formal relationship.
Further, the voluntary assumption of an informal fiduciary obligation can
arise by implication where, for example, a business entity sues to recover
monies due not to it but to one of its members or where a governmental
entity, such as a state or municipality, sues to recover for a loss suffered
by its employees.45 In such cases, the business or governmental entity
does not have actual standing to maintain a suit at law because it has not
suffered a loss. Nevertheless, the courts in equity have allowed standing
on the theory that the entity is the most convenient party to maintain the
action and upon the implication that it acts as a trustee for the real parties
in interest and holds any recovery for their benefit.
Similarly, in familial situations it is not necessary that the party to
whom the property is conveyed expressly promises to hold the property
"in trust." The trust is the rational implication of the oral promise to hold
the property and reconvey it at a future date. For example, in Gause v.
Gause,46 the court found a "verbal trust" even though there was no alle-
gation of an express trust. The suit was by a son and his wife against his
mother to impose a constructive trust upon land held by her. The son had
45. See, e.g., Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. Chicago & W. Ind. R. Co., 131 F.2d 215 (7th
Cir. 1942). In Grand Trunk, the court found a confidential relationship between a parent
railroad and one of its subsidiaries based upon an earlier cause of action brought by the
parent against another subsidiary to recover for underpayment of its share of a state stock
tax assessed against the parent. The subsidiaries had all contributed equally to the pay-
ment of the tax under an erroneous reading of the corporate charter. When it was later
determined that the charter should be read to require unequal payments based upon usage
of the railroad facilities, the result was that some of the subsidiaries had overpaid while
others had underpaid. The parent then brought suit against the underpaying subsidiaries
and recovered judgment. In Grand Trunk, the action was by an overpaying subsidiary
against the parent to recover the amount of the overpayment. The cause of action was in
equity based on a confidential relationship theory because an action at law was barred by
the statute of limitations. The court allowed recovery, reasoning that the parent, by impli-
cation, was acting as a trustee for the overpaying subsidiaries when it brought the earlier
action against the underpayers. The court noted that the parent, having been paid in full
for the stock tax, could not have been bringing the action for any loss it had suffered. See
id. at 217, 219; see also Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1955) (allowing a municipal-
ity to maintain action against former mayors to recover salary kick-backs paid to the may-
ors by city employees over a period in excess of thirty years as a "price" for continuing
their employment). Although the city itself had suffered no actual loss, the court empha-
sized that one of the pleas of the city was for a recovery "as trustee for the use and benefit
of the employees." Id. at 16.
Further, a promise to hold property in trust or to reconvey it can also be found by impli-
cation. See Sharp v. Kosmalski, 351 N.E.2d 721, 723 (N.Y. 1976) discussed infra note 101;
see also Sinclair v. Purdy, 139 N.E. 255, 258 (N.Y. 1923), in which Justice Cardozo stated:
Here was a man transferring to his sister the only property he had in the
world .... He was doing this, as she admits, in reliance upon her honor. Even
if we were to accept her statement that there was no distinct promise to hold
it for his benefit, the exaction of such a promise, in view of the relation,
might well have seemed to be superfluous.
See also Farano v. Stephanelli, 183 N.Y.S.2d 707, 713 (N.Y. App. Div.1959) (remedy of
constructive trust need not be determined by express promise of fiduciary to reconvey
property upon demand).
46. 430 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968, no writ).
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conveyed the land to his father on the oral representation of both parents
that their survivor at death of the other would reconvey the land to the
son and his wife. The parents paid valuable consideration for the land
and conducted improvements thereon over the years. The trial court
granted a constructive trust in the property to the son and his wife subject
to an equitable lien in favor of the mother in the amount of the consider-
ation paid and the cost of the improvements. In affirming the trial court's
judgment, the court on appeal concluded that the "verbal trust" had been
proved by "reasonably clear and certain" evidence. 47 The court also con-
cluded that a confidential relationship had existed between the son and
his parents at the time of the transaction in question. However, the only
evidence referred to by the court in finding a confidential relationship,
other than the status of parents and child, were that the son was an adult
of twenty-four years at the time of the transaction and of facts surround-
ing the transaction that are merely typical of arm's length bargaining.
The implication of a verbal trust arising from the promise to reconvey is
thus the stronger basis for the decision. The familial relationship between
the parties merely lent credence to the assertion of the oral promise.
Such credence is important, because the courts do require convincing
proof of the oral promise before they are willing to contravene the integ-
rity of deeds and written contracts. It may be believable that one would
convey valuable property to a close family member upon the naked, oral
assurance of reconveyance, whereas a similar transaction with someone
else would be inherently unbelievable. But a family relationship is not
determinative. For example, in Anaya v. Estrada,48 the court refused to
cancel a deed and to impose a constructive trust on land that had been
deeded to a brother by his siblings. The land had passed to all of them
upon death of their father in 1928, at which time all of the children lived
on the land. Following the father's death, the brother had ordered the
other children off of the land. Over the years the brother paid the mort-
gage debt and taxes on the land and conducted valuable improvements.
He did so for over fifteen years, at which time his brothers and sisters
deeded the land to him. Over twenty more years passed before they de-
manded that the land be divided between them. Upon the brother's re-
fusal, suit was filed. The plaintiffs alleged that their brother had orally
promised to hold the land in trust for them until he could sell it and di-
vide the proceeds among all the brothers and sisters. Although the court
did not emphasize the point, there was apparently no evidence in the rec-
ord to support the alleged oral agreement other than the assertion of the
various plaintiffs, an assertion belied by the brother's having remained
without objection in exclusive possession of the land for some thirty-five
years, twenty of those coming after the claimants had deeded the prop-
erty to him. In affirming the trial court's judgment against the plaintiffs,
the court emphasized instead that there was no evidence in the record to
47. Id. at 415.
48. 447 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no writ).
20001
SMU LAW REVIEW
support a confidential relationship between the brother and the plaintiffs,
"the only evidence set forth being that they were brothers and sisters and
had been to some extent on a friendly basis."'49 Thus, held the court, parol
evidence of the oral trust could not be introduced to contradict the terms
of the deed of conveyance.
Similarly, in Allen v. Jones,50 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma refused
to impose a constructive trust on real property held by the defendants,
who were the claimant's grandparents and the parents of the claimant's
father. The defendant's son, the claimant's father, had conveyed the
property to third persons and, in turn, his parents had repurchased it.
Apparently, the theory of the daughter's cause of action was that her fa-
ther's parents had impliedly repurchased the property in trust for him.
However, there was no evidence in the record to indicate that this was
indeed the intent of the parents, nor any evidence to support the trial
court's finding of a confidential relationship between the parents and the
son. Although the son was a heavy drinker, the evidence showed that he
was competent to conduct business when sober and was of average intelli-
gence. The son had sold the real property against the wishes of his par-
ents and for less than its value. Upon discovering this, the parents
repurchased the property in their own name. Because the sales were
made by the son without the knowledge of the parents and apparently
against their wishes, it was reasonably clear that the son did not repose
the kind of confidence or dependence upon his parents necessary to sup-
port a confidential relationship. The court concluded that the security of
real estate transactions demanded that proof of a confidential relation-
ship be established by "clear, strong and unequivocal [evidence] ... of the
most satisfactory and trustworthy kind."5' This the claimant had failed to
do.
The strong inclination to protect the validity of a written conveyance
against assault by a self-serving allegation of a contrary oral agreement
has perhaps led an occasional court to refuse to recognize the existence of
a confidential relationship when the facts as alleged, if proved, would
clearly support its existence. The unfortunate result is that the court
thereby gives a false signal as to the threshold of clarity necessary to
prove a confidential relationship rather than a true signal of the clarity
necessary to prove the alleged oral agreement.
A case in point is the decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in
Dixon v. Dixon.52 The factual allegations clearly met even the most strin-
gent concept of a confidential relationship. The allegations were that the
defendant was the brother of plaintiff's husband, a successful business-
man and one whose business ability the plaintiff and her husband greatly
respected. Their relations with the defendant were very cordial and close,
49. Id. at 247.
50. 110 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1941).
51. Id. at 917.
52. 87 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. 1955).
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and he had always given them advice as to business matters when re-
quested to do so. Plaintiff and her husband had suffered lengthy illnesses
and had become unable to pay off a mortgage loan on their tobacco farm.
Foreclosure was probable. Although they had a cash offer for the prop-
erty at near its market value, they wished to keep the farm and sought
defendant's advice. He agreed to take charge of the operation of the
farm and to try to work it out of debt. He said the tobacco on the farm
would be sold under a government plan, which he allegedly misrepre-
sented would require him to be the owner of the farm in order to make
sales under the plan. The land was deeded to defendant in reliance on his
promise to reconvey it when the loan was paid off. In the ensuing action
to impose a trust on the property, the trial court entered judgement in
accordance with the jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Georgia reversed. Without discussion, the court ruled
that plaintiff's factual allegations did not constitute a confidential rela-
tionship. The court also rejected her fraud claim on the basis that she had
presented no evidence that defendant knew that his statement regarding
the government tobacco plan was false or of any intention by defendant
to deceive. The court further noted that there was no evidence that the
alleged oral agreement had been breached because there was no showing
that the farm had earned sufficient monies to pay off the debt. Finally,
after a lengthy analysis, the court found that the trial court had commit-
ted reversible error by instructing the jury that the believability of the
alleged oral agreement must have been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. The court noted that to contravene a deed absolute on its face
an alleged parol agreement must be supported by proof "so clear, strong,
and satisfactory, as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the agreement. '53
The court then remanded the case for a new trial. It seems clear that the
true basis of the court's decision was the absence of a finding of clear and
convincing evidence supporting the oral agreement, rather than the
court's unsupported and questionable conclusion that no confidential re-
lationship existed between the parties.
Meeting the strict proof requirement for the oral agreement is aided
immeasurably when the close familial relationship is coupled with evi-
dence that the property was acquired for substantially less than its real
value. The underpayment by the defendant for the value received is
often indicative of his having taken unfair advantage of the plight of the
claimant. For example, in Hamblet v. Coveney,54 the trial court granted a
constructive trust against real estate held by a niece upon a jury finding of
a confidential relationship between the aunt and the niece. The aunt had
become delinquent in her mortgage payments and had sought to sell her
house. The niece and her husband agreed to purchase the house for
$80,000 cash and a promissory note for an additional sum of approxi-
mately $65,000, a portion of which represented a loan from the aunt to
53. Id. at 375.
54. 714 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the niece and her husband. The defendants then persuaded the aunt to
sign sale closing documents reflecting a total sales price of only $80,000,
with no debt obligation, by assuring the aunt that "they had their own
side agreement.155 On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court, finding that the aunt had met the burden of "strict proof" of
the oral agreement and of the confidential relationship necessary to es-
tablish a constructive trust. Although the evidence was disputed, the aunt
had shown that the families had a close relationship over many years, that
the aunt had assisted the niece during this period, that the families often
spent holidays together, that the niece's husband was accepted as part of
the family, and that the aunt had grown to trust and rely upon him.
Although the jury had found that the fraudulent conduct was entirely that
of the niece's husband, and none of her own, a constructive trust was
nevertheless appropriate on her interest in the property based on her
"unjust enrichment" arising from the confidential relationship she had
with her aunt.
Persuasive evidence of an oral agreement to hold property for another
and to reconvey it or its proceeds upon demand may take many forms,
including the testimony of disinterested third parties56 or proof that the
55. Id. at 132; see also Johnston v. Mabrey, 677 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1984, no writ) (constructive trust imposed on property deeded by former husband
to former wife before their second marriage which ended in divorce).
56. See, e.g., Hatton v. Turner, 622 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, no writ).
In Hatton, the defendant had told several persons, including his brothers and sisters, that
he was holding real estate conveyed to him by deed from his father for the benefit of the
entire family. The property had been deeded to him with no return consideration so that
his father could qualify for old-age insurance. See id. at 453. In imposing a constructive
trust in favor of the brothers and sisters, the court said:
The record in this case amply evidences a confidential relationship. Among
several factors which indicate a confidential relationship are kinship, ad-
vanced age and poor health, taken together with evidence of trust .... The
record here clearly shows the family kinship as parent-child and brother-sis-
ter and the status of the father's age and health. It is also clear as to the
confidence and trust which the father confided in his son, Lee Hatton, and as
to the confidence and reliance the appellees placed in their brother that he
would fulfill his assurances that he was holding the property in question for
the benefit of the appellees as heirs to their parents' estate.
Id. at 458-59.
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of the existence of the alleged oral agreement is
where the defendants, or least one of them, actually admits the deal. That fortunate occur-
rence transpired in Silver v. Silver, 219 A.2d 659 (Pa. 1966). In Silver, a widow intending to
remarry and fearful that her property might pass to the heirs of her betrothed, deeded her
property to her two sons without consideration a week prior to her marriage. The sons
orally agreed to reconvey the property to her upon demand. Some eleven years later, after
the death of her second husband and the death of one of the two sons, she requested return
of the property. The administratrix of the deceased son refused the request, and Ms. Silver
brought suit to establish a constructive trust on the property. Her surviving son admitted
the oral promise to reconvey and agreed to comply with a court order enforcing it. See id.
at 661. The court entered judgment for Ms. Silver, and the administratrix appealed. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment below with the following language:
We must therefore conclude, as did the chancellor and the court en banc,
that the natural confidence inspired by the mother-son relationship, along
with the evidence that the mother depended upon her sons for advice and
customarily abided by their decisions in matters of this sort, as well as the
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claimants have continued to contribute momentarily to the property held
by the defendant. Unless there is plausible evidence that the claimant
intended to make a gift to the defendant, continued contributions to the
property give strong support to the assertion that the claimant has an
interest in that property. For example, in Miller v. Huebner,57 two sisters
had filed an affidavit asserting an equitable interest in property held by
their brother. The brother then brought suit contesting the affidavit and
to remove the cloud on the title to the real estate. The property had been
acquired in the brother's name in 1947, at which time he had assumed the
position of head of the household because of the illness of both his
mother and father, who had become virtually helpless and incapacitated.
The evidence at trial demonstrated that the sisters had limited education,
having quit school in the seventh grade to help at home, that they had a
limited grasp of the English language, and that they felt obliged to follow
their brother's orders as head of the family. The land in question, a 276
acre tract, was purchased as a result of a decision made at a family meet-
ing in 1947. The brother and the two sisters pooled their money to make
the down-payment and agreed to work jointly to pay off the balance.
Over the years, until 1965, the sisters worked the farm without pay for the
mutual benefit of all, and any money earned by them was turned over to
their brother for the family good. When the brother married in 1965, he
repudiated the oral agreement and declared himself the sole owner of the
property. In sustaining the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust
on the property in favor of the two sisters, the court opined that "[a]
confidential relationship is clearly evident in the record" and that the re-
lationship "poses a classic case for the imposition of a constructive
trust." 58
An interesting factor supporting the plausibility of the oral agreement
to reconvey property arises when the clear purpose of the conveyance is
to mislead or defraud a third party. A case in point is Kostelnik v. Rob-
erts,59 which also presents a good example of the extension of a familial
confidential relationship to a person only distantly related by marriage.
The plaintiffs were an elderly couple who had decided to enter a conva-
lescent home. The defendant, who had agreed to help make the appro-
priate arrangements, advised them that in order to qualify for state
medical benefits they could not own any property at the time they were
admitted to the home and that any property they did own would be taken
from them. Defendant suggested that they put the property in his name
to protect it, and he promised to return it to them if they got well. The
court affirmed the trial court's judgment imposing a constructive trust on
the property. The court found that evidence of a confidential relationship
particular state of mind of Mrs. Silver at the time of the conveyance, ade-
quately establishes that a confidential relationship existed.
Id. at 662.
57. 474 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
58. Id. at 592.
59. 680 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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between the parties was "clearly evident" from the trial record. At trial,
the plaintiffs had testified that the defendant was "'real close to us,'
"'like a son,"' and "was 'related through marriage.'"6 The defendant
was a beneficiary in their will under which they had left to him everything
they owned. Ample evidence of a close personal relationship was also
supported by the fact that the defendant over time had made bank depos-
its and paid bills for the plaintiffs and was an authorized signatory on
both their checking and savings accounts. Although the defendant de-
nied the existence of the agreement, he defended that any such agree-
ment would be unenforceable because the conveyance to him, as alleged,
was for purposes of defrauding the state. This illicit purpose, he asserted,
deprived the plaintiffs of the "clean hands" necessary to obtain the equi-
table remedy of a constructive trust. The court properly rejected this ar-
gument on the basis that a clean hands defense may be raised only by a
party injured by the alleged wrongful conduct.61
Although, the "oral trust" cases probably comprise the most common
type of familial, confidential relationship litigation, a second recurring
type involves situations where the plaintiff has found himself in unfortu-
nate circumstances and a family member takes advantage of the plaintiff's
plight by cheating him out of money and property. In these cases, the
dire need of the claimant coupled with transactions unreasonably benefi-
cial to the family member provide strong evidence of an abuse of a confi-
dential relationship. For example, in Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore,62
the administrator of the estate of an aunt brought suit against her nephew
for breach of fiduciary duty and to recover money and real estate in the
nephew's possession. The property had been euchred from the aunt by
the nephew over a five-year period while she was in a convalescent center
suffering from her last illness. She was over ninety years of age, was seri-
ously incapacitated, suffered from impaired hearing and eyesight, and had
reached a "state of confusion." There was independent testimony in the
trial record from a private nurse of the aunt to the effect that the nephew
would from time-to-time persuade her to sign papers by representing that
it was necessary for hospital matters, to repair her house, or for nurses to
be paid. In reality some of these papers gave the nephew power over her
bank accounts, which after her death he closed and transferred the mon-
ies therein to his own personal accounts. On these facts, the trial court
60. Id. at 534.
61. Nor should the defense of illegality have aided the defendant. Although the gen-
eral rule is that illegal contracts, including those acting as a fraud on a third party, are void
as against public policy and that the courts will neither enforce nor undo them but rather
leave the parties as it finds them, relief will be given to the more innocent party where their
fault is not equal. See Bamman v. Erickson, 41 N.E.2d 920, 922 (N.Y. 1942) (allowing
recovery in restitution to the assignee of a "casual" bettor against a professional gambler
for payment of illegal gambling debts). In the Kostelnik case, the plaintiffs clearly were
acting on the defendant's advice and relied strongly on his counsel and, thus, should be
considered at lesser fault. Cf Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 938 F.2d 624 (5th Cir.
1991) (applying Texas law and denying recovery on check written by defendant lawyer for
illegal gambling debts).
62. 595 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1980).
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found a confidential relationship existed as a matter of law. The burden
of proof of showing the fairness of all transactions with his aunt was thus
placed on the nephew and, upon his failure to carry that burden, actual
and punitive damages were awarded against him for breach of his fiduci-
ary obligation. In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme
Court of Texas reasoned that when the nephew accepted gratuitous trans-
fers by his aunt during her period of incapacitation he "consented to have
his conduct measured by the standards of the finer loyalties exacted by
the courts of equity. '63
Of course, the plaintiff need not be in dire circumstances at all for a
trusted family member to wrongfully deprive him of money or property
rightfully his. It is quite easy for one who holds the trust and confidence
of another to defraud that other. Fraud itself, with or without an accom-
panying fiduciary relationship, is a recognized ground for invoking equity
jurisdiction and for imposing a constructive trust.64 When the defense to
the fraud action, however, is the running of the applicable statute of limi-
tations and a fiduciary or confidential relationship does exist between the
parties, the courts commonly use that relationship to delay accrual of the
statute until such time as the aggrieved party actually discovered the
fraud. The theory is that the trust and confidence he placed in the de-
fendant reasonably delayed inquiry into the underlying facts and, thus,
justified his failure to discover the fraud. For example, in Edsall v. Ed-
sall,65 a son brought suit against his father for recovery of an additional
portion of a herd of cattle which had been inherited by the son and father
as part of the community estate of the mother and wife. The father had
fraudulently misrepresented to his son that a substantial portion of the
herd was his separate property owned before his marriage. Several years
passed before the son acquired actual knowledge that the entire herd was
part of the community estate. In affirming the judgment of the trial court
granting the son an undivided interest in the herd, and in response to the
statute of limitations argument of the father, the court noted that at the
time of the father's fraudulent misrepresentation:
63. Id. at 509; see also Miller v. Miller, 700 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). In Miller, a former wife brought action against her former husband to rescind
a shareholder's agreement regarding corporate stock allegedly not disposed of by their
divorce decree. Her former spouse had persuaded her to sign the agreement without dis-
closing to her that a third party had agreed to purchase the shares for a price in excess of
$700,000. The court held that the fiduciary duty arising from their confidential relationship
had imposed upon him the burden of showing that the agreement was fair to her, which he
had failed to do. During their marriage, the former husband had handled all of the family
business affairs. The shareholder's agreement had been signed by the claimant as part of a
"friendly" divorce suit, and she testified that she had trusted her former husband in busi-
ness matters at the time of the divorce.
64. See Consolidated Bearing & Supply Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 720 S.W.2d 647, 649
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ) ("Even without a confidential relationship, actual
fraud by one party may also justify the imposition of a constructive trust."); see also Mead-
ows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1974).
65. 238 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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a relation of complete trust and confidence existed between plaintiff
and his father, that is to say, plaintiff then reposed in his father com-
plete confidence and trusted him implicitly, and he had no reason to,
and did not, doubt the rectitude of any representation so made to
him by his father.66
This trust and confidence excused any inquiry by the son into the bona
fides of the father's misrepresentations and prevented accrual of the stat-
ute until such time as the son acquired actual knowledge of the fraud.
The unfortunate predicament of the claimant need not be incapacita-
tion resulting from old age or ill health, but may take the more mundane
form of financial problems or an unfamiliarity with business matters. For
example, in Oak Cliff Bank & Trust Co. v. Steenbergen,67 a sister brought
action against her deceased brother's estate requesting the equitable rem-
edies of an accounting and a constructive trust on assets of the estate for
sums of money that she had given to her brother. The sister's husband
had died of a stroke and, over the subsequent period of some thirteen
years, she had relied on her brother to manage her estate and property.
The evidence at trial demonstrated that she placed complete reliance in
her brother with respect to these matters, that she had given him her
power of attorney, and that he was authorized to sign checks on her bank
account. The evidence demonstrated numerous transactions in which he
wrongfully used her funds to his own personal benefit. On these facts,
the court affirmed the trial court's finding of a confidential relationship
between the brother and sister and the imposition of a constructive trust
on assets of the estate.
B. FRIENDSHIPS
Of Social Interaction and Meretricious Doings
In relationships that are other than familial, it is much more difficult to
demonstrate the kind of trust and confidence that is necessary to establish
a confidential relationship. If the relationship is indeed a positive one, we
call it, for lack of a better word, friendship. But this word "friendship"
embodies much too broad a general concept to provide a reliable basis
for the imposition of fiduciary obligation. The term "friend" describes
someone with whom one shares a relationship that may vary from some-
thing slightly more than bare acquaintance to one in which the parties
indeed share an abiding trust and confidence. 68 Certainly, then, friend-
ship at one extreme can provide the foundation for the finding of a confi-
dential relationship. That friendship at a minimum must be personal in
nature, involving social interaction between the parties. A longstanding
business relationship, even if the parties are described as friends, is simply
66. Id. at 287.
67. 497 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
68. See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE UNABRIDGED (2d ed. 1983) (defining "friend" as "a person whom one knows well
and is fond of; intimate associate; close acquaintance, applied loosely to any associate or
acquaintance, or, as a term of address, even to a stranger.").
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not sufficient. A seminal case on point is the previously discussed deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Texas in Thigpen v. Locke.69 In that case,
despite the parties having become close friends and having engaged in
numerous business transactions over the years, the court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court directing a verdict that no confidential rela-
tionship existed between the parties.70 The evidence indicated nothing
more than that the parties had a quite friendly, but quite impersonal,
business relationship.
Similarly, the lack of a sustained personal, social interaction between
the parties dictated the negative finding by the court in Horton v. Har-
ris.71 The parties had shared a friendship extending over nearly a half
century and involving succeeding generations of their respective families.
Long after the relationship had become firmly established, the plaintiffs
suffered financial difficulties and were unable to continue payment on the
mortgage on their home. Upon the request of the plaintiffs, the defend-
ants came to their aid by paying the mortgage and taking the deed in
their name. They then allowed the plaintiffs to continue living on the
property under a tenancy at will. After several years, the plaintiffs
brought suit seeking a constructive trust on the property and alleging that
the defendants had orally promised to reconvey the property to them. In
a detailed opinion closely examining the lengthy relationship between the
parties and their respective families, the court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court refusing to find a confidential relationship. It was clear
from the record that the interaction between the parties and their families
over the years, albeit quite friendly, had always involved arm's length
business matters. Accordingly, despite that "long-standing friendship,
' '72
the record did not demonstrate "such evidence of justifiable trust and
confidence as will create a fiduciary relationship. '73
Further, the necessary relationship must be current and ongoing at the
time of the transaction at issue. For example, in Dodson v. Kung,74 the
relationship between the parties early on was an extremely close and per-
sonal one, "described as both father/son and mentor/protege. '75 How-
ever, that relationship was formed when the plaintiff was but a "boy." It
did not continue later on while plaintiff went off to college, graduated,
and established himself in business. Some twenty years passed before the
parties came together again in the transaction at issue in which they es-
tablished a new corporation, employing the plaintiff as president and
granting him a block of the corporation's stock. Over two years later, the
69. 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1962); see also supra text accompanying note 27.
70. See also Hansen v. Christie, 132 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939,
no writ). (Although plaintiff alleged he and defendant had become "close friends" and "he
trusted" defendant, "mere fact that they were friends would not constitute a fiduciary
relationship.").
71. 610 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-yler 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
72. Id. at 824.
73. Id. at 823.
74. 717 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. Id. at 387.
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plaintiff became dissatisfied with how the corporation was being run, re-
signed, and brought suit against the defendant alleging a breach of an oral
promise to repurchase the stock for $100,000. The defendant denied the
agreement and raised the defense of the statute of frauds. The plaintiff
sought to contravene this defense based on an alleged confidential rela-
tionship with the defendant. The court on appeal affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment finding that no confidential relationship ex-
isted between the parties at the time of the transaction at issue. The court
noted that despite the fact that the "relationship at issue was one of busi-
ness and friendship, ' 76 at the time of the transaction at issue the plaintiff
was no longer regarded by the defendant as either a son or prot6gd. The
plaintiff had become a sophisticated business person, and there was "no
evidence that these men were not dealing at arm's length and on equal
terms" 77 at the time of the alleged oral promise.
What is clear, then, is that for friendship to provide the basis for a
confidential relationship the friendship must involve current close per-
sonal and social interaction. When the courts do base a confidential rela-
tionship on friendship, they uniformly emphasize these elements of the
relationship.78 Of course, friendship, no matter how close and personal,
does not in and of itself establish the fiduciary obligation of one of the
parties. The core issue, always, is whether under the facts and circum-
stances the party claiming a confidential relationship was reasonably jus-
tified in reposing trust and confidence in his friend to guard and protect
the claimant's interest with respect to the transaction at issue. Unlike in
the familial relationship cases, where the reasonableness of the trust re-
posed may often be presumed from the relationship itself, in friendship
cases, even close, personal ones, other factors are usually necessary to
demonstrate that reasonableness.
In Kalb v. Norsworthy,79 for example, the critical element, in addition
to friendship, was that the plaintiff had assumed a position of control over
his friend's, the defendant's, financial affairs. The action involved a suit
by an accountant on a promissory note that was absolute on its face. The
defendant sought to show that the note was for services not performed
76. Id. at 389.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Frowen v. Blank, 425 A.2d 412, 418 (Pa. 1981) ("close social relation-
ship"); Horton v. Robinson, 776 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ)
("long-time friends"); Dominguez v. Brackey Enter., Inc., 756 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1988, writ denied) ("good social friends"); Dodson v. Kung, 717 S.W.2d
385, 387 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("father/son and mentor/
protege"); Garcia v. Fabela, 673 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ)
("close friends and personal confidants"); Adickes v. Andreoli, 600 S.W.2d 939, 945 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ dism'd) ("close personal friends"); Bush v.
Stone, 500 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("as if
he were a member of his own family"); Kalb v. Norsworthy, 428 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ) ("close personal friendship"); Holland v.
Lesesne, 350 S.W.2d 859, 861-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("warm personal friends"; "unusually close personal friendly and confidential
relationship").
79. 428 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ).
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and alleged a confidential relationship with the plaintiff. The note was
given while the defendant was in the midst of a divorce proceeding and
reflected charges for accounting services that would be performed by the
plaintiff only in the event that the divorce went to trial. The plaintiff had
persuaded the defendant to sign the note, advising him that if his divorce
went to trial the note would be used as evidence of accounting expenses
incurred for plaintiff's services in preparing reports for trial and for trial
testimony. The evidence demonstrated that, in addition to plaintiff's be-
ing defendant's accountant, the parties had a long standing personal rela-
tionship, that they often visited in each other's homes, and that the
defendant had been the plaintiff's best man at his wedding.
The court on appeal reversed the directed verdict of the trial court for
the plaintiff, concluding that a fiduciary relationship existed between the
parties. In support of its conclusion, the court noted that the defendant
"was accustomed to being guided by the judgment or advice of [the plain-
tiff] in legal and accounting matters relating to income taxation. ' 80 That
fact, coupled with the parties' close personal friendship, justified the de-
fendant "in placing confidence in the belief that [plaintiff] would act in his
best interest." 81
Similarly, in Bush v. Stone,82 the claimant was allowed to avoid the
running of the statute of limitations and to maintain a fraud action
against the defendant because the confidential relationship between the
parties excused an early discovery of the defendant's machinations. The
parties had engaged in an ongoing business arrangement, in the course of
which the plaintiff had allowed the defendant complete control of the
record keeping of income and expenses. Although a careful examination
of the financial reports given plaintiff by defendant might have led to an
early discovery of the defendant's fraud, the close personal relationship
between the parties justified the plaintiff's trust in defendant and his fail-
ure to examine the financial reports more closely. The court thus re-
versed the trial court's judgment dismissing plaintiff's cause of action,
holding that the evidence amply demonstrated a confidential relationship
80. Id. at 705.
81. Id. See also Dominguez v. Brackey Enter., Inc., 756 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 1988, writ denied) ("Where a party is accustomed to being guided by the judgment
or advice of another in legal and accounting matters relating to income taxation, and there
exists a long association in a business relationship, as well as a personal friendship, the first
party is justified in placing confidence in the belief that the other party will act in his best
interest."); Horton v. Robinson, 776 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ)
("A layman would be expected to rely upon one who was an attorney when a new business
was started, particularly when they were long-time friends and an attorney-client relation-
ship had previously existed."); Pope v. Darcey, 667 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.]1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (In Pope, the court canceled earnest money contract under
terms of which plaintiff was to purchase property from deceased, who had inherited it from
his sister who was a former client of attorney plaintiff. Plaintiff was intimately familiar
with the property from years of representing deceased's sister, and a confidential relation-
ship existed with deceased, who was an elderly man not in complete possession of his
faculties, where there was both dominance on the part of plaintiff and weakness coupled
with trust on the part of defendant).
82. 500 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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between the parties based on a close, personal friendship that had lasted
some twenty-six years. The evidence showed that over this period the
parties had continual social contact, often visiting each other's homes and
going on hunting trips together. The plaintiff had testified that he
"trusted the defendant the same as if he were a member of his own
family." 83
Just as in the familial cases, the close personal relationship cases often
involve actions for breach of an oral promise to hold property in trust for
the claimant or to reconvey it to him. As was noted previously, the rela-
tionship of the parties in these "oral trust" cases must be coupled with
persuasive evidence of the believability of the oral promise in order to
persuade the court to contravene the deed or contract of conveyance.8 4
In Tuck v. Miller,85 for example, that evidence was in the form of Tuck's
having acquired title to the property at a small fraction of its value, the
cost of refinancing the unpaid mortgage. The Millers had been exper-
iencing dire financial circumstances, were unable to make their mortgage
payments, and could not obtain a loan to refinance the property. Tuck
agreed to take title to the property in his own name, refinance it, and
reconvey it to the Millers upon reimbursement for his expenses. In his
alleged words: "What are friends for if they can't help you?"' 86 The evi-
dence at trial amply demonstrated a long-standing personal friendship be-
tween Tuck and the Millers.
In Holland v. Lesesne,87 the parties, two families, had also been "warm
close personal friends" 88 for many years. They decided to buy property
together for joint weekend outings. They agreed to take title to the prop-
erty in both their names and to own it jointly. They found an apparently
ideal site with two houses on the property, and Mr. Holland undertook to
handle the arrangements for its purchase. Without the knowledge of the
Lesesnes, however, Mr. Holland took title to the property solely in his
name. Some months later, after Holland attempted forcefully to dispos-
sess the Lesesnes, they brought action seeking a constructive trust on
their interest in the property. The court affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment granting a constructive trust in favor of the Lesesnes based on a
confidential relationship evidenced by a close personal relationship over
many years in which the families visited each other regularly, often dined
together, and regularly vacationed together. But most importantly, per-
suasive evidence of the oral agreement between the parties was demon-
strated by the fact that the Lesesnes lived in one of the houses on the
property for several months without objection from the Hollands, and
83. Id. at 887.
84. See supra note 48 and accompanying discussion.
85. 483 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. Id. at 905; see also Garcia v. Fabela, 673 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984, no writ) (involving breach of promise to reconvey home to plaintiff under circum-
stances where plaintiffs had known and trusted defendants as close friends and personal
confidants for approximately 20 years prior to the transaction at issue).
87. 350 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961, no writ).
88. Id. at 860.
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apparently without payment of rent, and that the Lesesnes had incurred
substantial costs in making improvements on the property.
89
The elderly, when infirm, lonely, and otherwise vulnerable, are inviting
targets for the exercise of the kind of undue influence by perceived
friends that is in many cases the hallmark of a violation of a confidential
relationship. Actual fraud is often an unnecessary artifice to the wrong-
doer in these cases because the trust reposed in him itself enables him to
persuade his victim that a transaction or other dealing is a good move for
the victim. Nondisclosure, misrepresentation, or tainting the true facts,
other than the wisdom of the deal itself, is unnecessary. In Frowen v.
Blank,90 for example, Frowen brought action to rescind the sale of her
farm alleging both fraud and breach of a confidential relationship. The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the court below that she had
failed to prove fraud, having had full knowledge of the operable facts
pertaining the transaction of sale, but reversed and remanded, finding
that a confidential relationship existed between the parties at the time of
the transaction. The only issue on remand was to be the contested fair-
ness of the transaction of sale, with the burden of proof resting on the
defendant Blank as a fiduciary. Blank had purchased the seventy acre
farm from Frowen for $15,000, but evidence in the trial record showed
that the fair market value of the farm at the time of the transaction was
$35,000. Ms. Frowen had retained a life interest in the house and garden
on the property, as well as any income from the gas lease. A "close social
relationship" and "long friendship" 91 had developed between the parties
prior to the transaction at issue. At the time of the execution of the
agreement Ms. Frowen was eighty-six years old and had been suffering
from a loss of hearing and eyesight. She was a widow with little formal
education and little knowledge of business matters. The defendant and
his wife had purchased the farm next to hers and over the years a close
social relationship developed between the widow and the young couple
with Ms. Frowen teaching the neighbors about farming and they in turn
helping her with chores and driving her to local social events. They also
customarily celebrated birthdays together.92
Undoubtedly, the clearest case for finding a confidential relationship
based upon friendship is where the parties are not related by blood or
marriage but have, in essence, become members of the same core family
unit. In Turner v. Miller,93 a guardian of an elderly mental incompetent,
Bertha Miller, who was an eighty-two-year-old widow rancher, brought
suit against George Turner. For many years Miller's business and per-
sonal affairs had been managed by her only son, who died in 1974. Miller
became despondent and lived alone. During this period she met Turner,
to whom she sold all of her cattle and a grass lease upon which to graze
89. See id. at 860-62.
90. 425 A.2d 412 (Pa. 1981).
91. Id. at 417, 418.
92. See id. at 417.
93. 618 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.)
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them. She also granted Turner and his wife an option to purchase both
surface and mineral rights in a portion of her property at a price of $80 an
acre. Over a short period of time there developed a close family-like
relationship between the Turners and Mrs. Miller, who considered and
treated the Turners as her own children. Some two months after their
initial acquaintance, she gave George Turner her general power of attor-
ney and later on gave one to Mrs. Turner as well. Ultimately the Turners
moved out of their trailer, which was located on Mrs. Miller's property,
and moved into her home because her health was declining and she
needed someone to take of her. By this time the Turners were handling
most of Mrs. Miller's business affairs and had opened joint bank accounts
with her. There was testimony at trial that Miller was drinking exces-
sively through these years and had suffered related complications and
that she had been hospitalized some fifty or sixty times since her hus-
band's death for her drinking problem. In the words of the court, this
problem "had rapidly advanced her natural senility. '94 Ultimately, Miller
conveyed to the Turners her ranch, worth more than $400,000, in return
for the Turners assuming the mortgage balance of $34,000 and their
promising to pay her the sum of $1000 a month for the balance of her life.
Additionally, as the new owners of the ranch, the Turners began receiving
gas royalties of approximately $40,000 while paying Mrs. Miller the prom-
ised $1000 a month. On these extraordinary facts, the court demon-
strated no difficulty in affirming the trial court's judgment setting aside
the deeds on the basis of breach of a fiduciary relationship. As profiting
fiduciaries, the Turners suffered the presumption that transactions with
their beneficiary were presumed unfair, and their failure to rebut that
presumption justified the trial court's judgment.95
Another emotionally-compelling case is Swain v. Moore,96 in which an
elderly man who lived alone befriended a neighboring family. Over time,
he became extremely popular with the family, especially since he owned a
television set, which the court termed the "latest popular American vehi-
cle of amusements. '97 This relationship continued to develop for more
than a year. During this period Swain gratuitously transferred money
and property to the Moores in the form of savings bonds, title to his auto-
mobile, and money to buy dirt and bathroom fixtures. Ultimately, he
gave the Moores $2700 in exchange for an oral promise that he would be
allowed to continue to live with them in their home. However, soon after
he moved in, the relationship between the parties disintegrated. Swain
moved out of the house and brought action to recover from the Moores
the money and property that he had transferred to them. The court gave
judgment for Swain, finding ample evidence of a fiduciary relationship
between the parties. The evidence showed that Swain, before meeting
94. Id. at 87.
95. See id. at 86-88.
96. 71 A.2d 264 (Del. Ch. 1950).
97. Id. at 265.
[Vol. 53
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS
the Moores, was a lonely old man who lived alone and that he lacked a
strong association with his own family.98 The court determined that he
was, thus, a particularly vulnerable target for exploited affection. The
burden was on the Moores as fiduciaries to demonstrate the fairness of
the various transactions at issue and, given the fact that they gave no
consideration for the property transferred to them, they clearly failed to
carry that burden.99
Finally, extra-marital or other meretricious relationships offer fertile
ground for establishing confidential relationships based on "friend-
ship."'1 Love, whether or not reciprocated, can be a very expensive
commodity, as is well demonstrated by Sharp v. Kosmalski.1° 1 Upon the
death of his wife of thirty-two years, Sharp, a fifty-six-year-old dairy
farmer with an eighth-grade education, developed what the court termed
a "very close relationship" with Kosmalski, a forty-year-old school
teacher. Kosmalski began helping the inaptly-named Sharp with various
domestic matters, including disposing of his deceased wife's belongings.
Over time, Sharp became quite dependant on Kosmalski and ultimately
declared his love for her. She, however, refused his proposal of marriage,
but continued to permit him to shower her with gifts with the hormonally
heightened hope that she could be persuaded to change her mind. He
gave her access to his bank account, from which she withdrew substantial
amounts of money. He also named her as sole beneficiary of his will and
executed a deed naming her joint owner of his farm. Ultimately, he also
transferred his remaining interest in the farm to her. It took a few years,
but after his assets had been reduced to some $300, she ordered him off
the farm and took possession of it and all of the equipment thereon.
Braving the notoriety of a public trial, Sharp sued Kosmalski, but to his
undoubted chagrin, his complaint was dismissed by the trial court, a deci-
sion that was affirmed without opinion on appeal. To his good fortune,
the Court of Appeals of New York took mercy, found that the above facts
did indeed state a cause of action based on breach of a confidential rela-
tionship, and remanded the case for another public trial. In response to
Kosmalski's prepubescent-like assertion that she had breached no express
promise to Sharp, the court concluded that, given the fiduciary relation-
ship between the parties, an implied promise by Kosmalski to hold the
98. See id. at 265-67.
99. See id. at 267.
100. See, e.g., Artache v. Goldin, 519 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (viable claim
was stated to prevent unjust enrichment by imposing constructive trust on family residence
held in defendant's name pursuant to oral agreement whereby parties agreed to live to-
gether as husband and wife, had done so for 14 years, and had shared family residence with
their four children for a period of nine years.); Muller v. Sobol, 97 N.Y.S.2d 905 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1950) (although meretricious relationship between parties living together as man and
wife for over 20 years was not to be condoned, it could not be said that a confidence
between the parties did not arise from that relationship so that agreements between them
would be enforced, despite the lack of a writing, in order to prevent unjust enrichment).
101. 351 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1976).
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property for Sharp's benefit was fairly suggested by the facts.102
C. BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
Of Near Joint Venture and Failed Fraud
Except for the formally-recognized fiduciary relationships, such as at-
torney-client and doctor-patient, a business relationship is the antithesis
of fiduciary obligation. It is the hallmark of a business relationship that
each party expects to benefit thereby and that each looks to that end and
otherwise to his own self-interest. Accordingly, the rule is well settled
everywhere that a business relationship, no matter how long and cordial
its duration, 10 3 does not give rise to fiduciary obligation. It is perhaps
102. See also Williams v. Lynch, 666 N.Y.S.2d 749 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (in action for
constructive fraud, woman's testimony, viewed favorably, indicated confidential relation-
ship with longtime cohabitant, that cohabitant had taken unfair advantage of her confi-
dence to assume control over their financial affairs, and that she justifiably trusted him
with respect to handling such affairs, so that cohabitant would bear burden of showing no
deception had been practiced regarding alleged oral agreement entered into prior to their
breaking up that she could have lifetime use of his home); White v. Lamborn, Civ. A. No.
4471, slip op.at *4, *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 1978) (wherein constructive trust imposed for return
of farm to plaintiff where he had conveyed farm to defendant during extra-marital sexual
relationship with her which had begun when he was 74 years of age!; farm had been sold to
her for less than half its value and a confidential relationship between the parties was
demonstrated by evidence of his age, of his love for her, that he came to her for support
and advice, that he had appointed her executrix of his estate and that he had given her his
power of attorney).
In Williams v. Lynch a vigorous dissent opined:
Stripped of all bold conclusory claims and strained legal theories, the factual
allegations of the amended complaint and the evidence adduced on defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment tell nothing more than a story of a rela-
tionship gone bad and a cohabitant's effort to obtain the kind of
postdissolution monetary distribution that traditional mores and established
New York law reserves to spouses.
Id. at 753.
103. See Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1038 (4th Cir.
1997) (business relationship of long and cordial duration insufficient standing alone to es-
tablish confidential relationship); Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp.,
823 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1992) (relationship between franchisor and franchisee for a pe-
riod of over forty years insufficient to establish fiduciary obligation); Consolidated Bearing
& Supply Co., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 720 S.W.2d 647, 650 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no
writ) (long-standing relationship between bank and its valued customer insufficient to es-
tablish fiduciary obligation); Winston v. Lake Jackson Bank, 574 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ) (claim of extensive prior dealings alleges no
specific facts to demonstrate confidential relationship); Barnett v. Matz, 483 S.W.2d 315,
319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, no writ) (extensive prior business dealings between par-
ties insufficient to establish a confidential relationship).
Many of the cases in which the courts have refused to find a confidential relationship
based upon business dealings, particularly those in which the relationship has been of long
duration, have resulted in the courts emphasizing that a particular type of business rela-
tionship does not achieve the status of a formal fiduciary relationship. In Crim Truck, for
example, the court held specifically that a franchisor does not owe fiduciary duties to a
franchisee, and the court cited over a dozen cases from other jurisdictions reaching that
conclusion. See Crim Truck, 823 S.W.2d at 595 n.5. Similarly, in Consolidated Bearing the
court held that the long-standing relationship between a bank and its valued customer did
not give rise to a confidential relationship. See Consolidated Bearing, 720 S.W.2d at 650;
see also Thomson v. Norton, 604 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (rela-
tionship of bank and customer is not a confidential relationship). The bank cases are
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typical of many ongoing business relationships that the parties have nur-
tured a well-developed trust and confidence in each other. However, the
oft-stated rule is that a "mere subjective trust" is not of the kind that will
create a confidential relationship. 1 4 The usual trust and confidence
shared between business people is that each will act fairly and will honor
the letter and spirit of mutual business transactions. When that trust fails,
a breach of contract action may arise, but not the breach of a fiduciary
obligation.
In the course of business relations, the cordiality attendant to the nego-
tiation and performance of transactions may give rise to a certain "friend-
ship" between the parties. It is inherent in many kinds of business
relationships that one party may wine, dine, and entertain the other on a
regular basis. This kind of interaction, however, indicates no more than
what could be called a "business friendship," not the kind of close, per-
sonal friendship that the courts sometimes recognize as the basis for a
confidential relationship. 10 5 Fiduciary obligation is firmly based on the
justifiable expectation that the principal will look after the beneficiary's
interests as well as his own. In business relationships, even quite friendly
ones, the reasonable understanding of the parties is that each continues
to give primary, perhaps exclusive, attention to his own interest.10 6 The
merely a subset of a large body of case law uniformly holding that the relationship of
creditor and debtor is not a confidential relationship. Indeed, in the watershed case of
Thigpen v. Locke, referred to throughout this article, an important part of the court's hold-
ing was that, absent extraordinary facts to the contrary, the relationship of creditor and
debtor is not a confidential relationship. See Thigpen, 363 S.W.2d at 253; see also Ed
Schory & Sons, Inc. v. Society Nat'l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 1074, 1081 (Ohio 1996) (mere
debtor/creditor relationship without more will not create a fiduciary relationship);
Hopewell Enter., Inc. v. Trustmark Nat'l Bank, 680 So. 2d 812, 817 (Miss. 1996) (since no
fiduciary relationship exists between a debtor and creditor, no duty of confidentiality can
be imposed on the creditor); Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 656 P.2d 1089,
1093 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (lender is not a fiduciary of its borrower; a special relationship
must develop between a lender and a borrower before a fiduciary duty exists); Landes v.
Sullivan, 651 N.Y.S.2d 731, 734 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (relationship between a vendor and
purchaser is simply a debtor/creditor relationship and does not give rise to fiduciary obliga-
tion); In re Gertzman, 446 S.E.2d 130, 134 (N.C. App. 1994) (relationship between debtor
and creditor will not usually establish a fiduciary duty of the creditor); Winston v. Lake
Jackson Bank, 574 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ)
(relationship of debtor and creditor is not a fiduciary one; fact that bank president has
been financial adviser to endorser of note established no more than a creditor/debtor
relationship).
104. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176-77 (Tex. 1997);
Crim Truck, 823 S.W.2d at 595; Thigpen, 363 S.W.2d at 253. The reason customarily given
by the courts for refusing to find a confidential relationship in business relationship cases is
that subjective trust alone will not establish the relationship. The "mere subjective trust"
limitation is discussed supra following note 25.
105. A helpful and widely-cited discussion of the point is found in Thigpen. See
Thigpen, 363 S.W.2d at 253. The case is discussed supra at note 27. The discussion de-
scribes a lengthy business relationship, with favors exchanged between the parties, and the
headnote to the case describes the parties as "close friends." Nevertheless, despite the
close business association extending over a number of years and over numerous transac-
tions, the court correctly found that no confidential relationship existed between the
parties.
106. The economic system in this country firmly rests on this proposition of which
Adam Smith, if citation is necessary, is likely its best known proponent. See A. SmrrH,
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common law of contract by necessity mirrors this economic philosophy.
The core function of contract law is to determine which among all
promises will be given legal sanction. Generally speaking, the determina-
tion is that those promises supported by consideration will be enforced.
In turn, consideration itself is defined in terms of whether the promissor
received in exchange something she wanted. Consideration may be virtu-
ally anything imaginable, ostensibly valuable or even worthless, as long as
it is that for which the promissor bargained.' 0 7 Consistent with this defi-
nition is that the law of contract will not inquire into its adequacy. 10 8 In
Hobbes's memorable words: "The value of all things contracted for, is
measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore the just value,
is that which they be contented to give."'1 9 Foreign to the bargaining
process is the rational expectation that equitable principles will intervene
to require full disclosure of known or likely adversity or that the transac-
tion itself, if culminated, will be beneficial or even fair to one or both
parties.110 These matters are left to the common law of fraudulent non-
disclosure and to statutory laws protecting consumers. For these basic
reasons, absent extraordinary circumstances, a business relationship can-
not form the basis for the imposition of fiduciary duties."'
Nevertheless, there are many cases in which the courts have found a
confidential relationship between parties whose relational history has
WEALTH OF NATIONS (5th ed. London 1789) ("It is not from the benevolence of the
butcher, the brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never
talk to them of our necessities but of their advantages," quoted in L. FULLER & M. EISEN-
BERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 42 (5th ed. 1990)).
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS §§ 71, 79 (1981).
108. See id. § 79.
109. Hobbes, Levithan, Ch. 15, quoted in L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CON.
TRACT LAW 43 (5th ed. 1990).
110. See Trevino v. Sample, 565 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (evidence that property owners and creditor had dealt with each other over the
years in arm's length transactions involving loans made to owners by creditor and that they
trusted creditor implicitly was insufficient to establish a confidential relationship between
property owners and creditor and thus there was no duty for creditor to disclose to prop-
erty owners the disadvantageous aspects of a refinance loan that actually increased the
debt amount, the monthly payment, and the interest rate).
111. It is especially in the business relationship cases that it is so hard to understand
why the trial judge allows a case to go to trial on the issue of a confidential relationship
when the only prior history between the parties is business oriented, short in duration, with
nothing in the facts to indicate that one party would justifiably repose trust in the other. In
such cases, after the time and expense of trial has been incurred, the judge is left with no
choice but to enter a judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict if indeed the jury finds in
favor of a confidential relationship. A case in point is Marut v. Collier, 583 S.W.2d 682(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Marut the jury found in
favor of a confidential relationship, and the trial judge's judgment notwithstanding that
verdict was upheld on appeal. See id. Even more inexplicable, of course, are pure business
relationship cases in which the trial judge sustains the jury's verdict finding a confidential
relationship. See Friedman v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 456 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ) (jury verdict finding confidential relationship reversed
on appeal).
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been exclusively business oriented.112 The cases are extraordinary be-
cause business relationships clearly provide the least fertile ground for
sustaining a confidential relationship. In each of the cases, however, the
claimant has carried the heavy burden of showing that the normal rules
and expectations of business behavior did not apply and that he was justi-
fied in his expectation that the party to be charged would protect the
claimant's interests as well as his own.
112. An exceptional line of cases demands mention at this point. These cases use the
theory of "quasi fiduciary relationship," as opposed to "confidential relationship" to im-
pose fiduciary obligations on one party to a business transaction. The transaction is usu-
ally, but not always, a loan and the "quasi fiduciary" is the lender. In the typical case,
during the course of loan negotiations, the borrower has requested that the loan be in-
sured, either by mortgage insurance or by credit life insurance or both. Upon death or
default of the borrower, the loan is discovered to be uninsured. In the ensuing litigation on
the debt obligation, the courts find that the lender has violated a "quasi fiduciary" obliga-
tion by failing to obtain the requested insurance for the borrower, or by failing to advise
the borrower that the borrower must obtain the insurance himself, or, in cases where mort-
gage insurance rather than credit life insurance has been provided, by failing to advise the
borrower of the difference between the two types of insurance.
In these cases, it is clear that a confidential relationship does not exist between the par-
ties because, in virtually all of the cases, there is no prior relationship or dealings between
the parties to support a confidential relationship. In imposing this "quasi fiduciary" re-
sponsibility on the lender, the courts emphasize the complexity of the loan negotiation
process and the related insurance options of the borrower, the ignorance of the borrower
regarding such matters, the vastly superior knowledge of the lender, and the resulting justi-
fied reliance on the lender by the borrower to protect the borrower's interests regarding
obtaining the insurance requested by the borrower. See Lowery v. Guaranty Bank & Trust
Co., 592 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1991) (where, based upon prior transactions with the borrower,
lender knew or should have known borrower wished to obtain credit life insurance on all
loans, question of fact existed as to whether lender violated a quasi fiduciary obligation by
failing to notify borrower of the expiration of credit life insurance); Stone v. Davis, 419
N.E.2d 1094 (Ohio 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981) (once borrower indicated de-
sire for insurance coverage, lender violated quasi fiduciary obligation to borrower by not
purchasing insurance for borrower or by failing to disclose that borrower would be re-
quired to procure the insurance himself); Parnell v. First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 336 So. 2d 764
(Miss. 1976) (lender violated quasi fiduciary obligation by failing to obtain credit life insur-
ance where borrower indicated desire for such insurance during loan negotiations); Hutson
v. Wenatchee Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 588 P.2d 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (lender vio-
lated quasi fiduciary duty to distinguish for borrower difference between mortgage insur-
ance and credit life insurance where mortgage insurance had specialized meaning in
lending industry that it did not have elsewhere). See also Boonstra v. Stevens-Norton, Inc.,
393 P.2d 287 (Wash. 1964) (defendant, a company engaged in procurement and sale of real
estate contracts and mortgages, possessed superior business knowledge and experience and
had quasi fiduciary duty to disclose information of which customer was ignorant where
customer justifiably relied on defendant's knowledge and experience). These cases are sui
generis and are not authority for defining the parameters of confidential relationships. In-
deed, the results in the "quasi fiduciary relationship" cases could be better understood by
applying basic principles of contract or agency law. See generally Mark Budnitz, The Sale
of Credit Life Insurance: The Bank as Fiduciary, 62 N.C. L. REv. 295 (1984) (rejecting the
quasi fiduciary theory and suggesting that the lender should be considered an agent of the
borrower and that the lender's responsibilities should be governed by traditional agency
law).
The potential for confusing these cases with ones involving true confidential relation-
ships is undoubtedly heightened by the wont of some courts to describe a "confidential
relationship" as a "quasi fiduciary relationship." See Liebergesell v. Evans, 613 P.2d 1170,
1178 (Wash. 1980); Brown v. Brown, 563 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Ark. 1978); Hatton v. Meade,
502 N.E.2d 552, 557 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987); Lee v. Lee, No. 11-058, 11-67, 1986 WL 9656, at
*6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1986).
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A recurring scenario is property based and is similar in many respects
to the oral trust or reconveyance cases discussed previously in context
with the familial and friendship cases. The claimant, asserting only a
prior business relationship with the defendant, seeks to avoid one or both
the parol evidence rule and the statute of frauds and to impose a con-
structive trust or other equitable remedy on property held by the defend-
ant under a deed or other document of conveyance that purports to grant
full title to the defendant. As previously discussed, the courts in these
cases are understandably reticent to undermine the sanctity of written
agreements absent compelling evidence supporting the believability of
the alleged oral agreement and of the reasonableness of the claimant's
expectation that the defendant would hold the property for the claimant's
benefit. In the aforementioned discussion, that evidence was supplied, in
part, by emotional factors pertaining to the trust and confidence under-
standably reposed in a close personal friend or family member. In the
business relationship cases, however, emotional factors are usually ab-
sent. Nevertheless, the claimant is able to show plausible evidence of the
alleged oral agreement based on prior transactions with the defendant
similar to the alleged oral one. These prior transactions have allegedly
justified the claimant in reposing the trust and confidence in the defend-
ant that the transaction at issue would be handled in the same or similar
manner. 113 And, although the relationship between the parties is not a
formal fiduciary one, such as that of partners or joint venturers, or of
agent and principal, the courts use equity to impose a constructive trust,
or an equitable lien, on the property at issue and, in appropriate cases,
punitive damages against the defendant based on a justifiable trust and
confidence reposed in him by the claimant with respect to the transaction
at issue. As the basis for imposing equity in these cases, albeit something
of a misnomer given the lack of a personal relationship between the par-
113. Prior transactions between the parties to the alleged oral agreement are critical to
establishing the confidential relationship between them, and similar prior transactions are
important, although not critical, evidence of the believability of the oral agreement. Evi-
dence establishing the credibility of the oral agreement is necessary to persuade courts to
contravene the integrity of the written instrument of conveyance. For instructive cases on
these points, see Consolidated Gas & Equip. Co. of Am. v. Thompson, 405 S.W.2d 333
(Tex. 1966), and Patton v. Callaway, 522 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). In both these cases, plaintiffs sought to establish a constructive trust in an
overriding royalty mineral interest based on the breach of an alleged oral agreement simi-
lar to that in Gaines v. Hamman, discussed infra at note 115. However, in both cases,
unlike in Gaines, the alleged oral agreement was the initial transaction of that nature be-
tween the parties, although in Patton there had been two prior unrelated transactions be-
tween one of the plaintiffs and the defendant. Both cases denied recovery, finding no
confidential relationship between the parties and refusing to enforce the oral agreement
because of the statute of frauds. In Patton, the court buttressed its conclusion with the
maxim that prior arm's length business transactions between parties do not establish a
confidential relationship and that such a relationship must exist prior to and apart from the
transaction at issue. In Consolidated Gas, the court reasoned that subjective trust of one




ties, the courts say that a "confidential relationship" existed between the
parties at the time the defendant engaged in the illicit transaction.
An excellent case in point is Gaines v. Hamman.114 Gaines was a ge-
ologist, who over a five-year period entered into numerous transactions
with Hamman, an oil and gas lease broker. In these transactions, Gaines
would work up geological information on various tracts of land and iden-
tify those that showed promise for oil and gas exploration. In turn, Ham-
man would acquire leases on the properties, usually in his own name, and
underwrite the necessary expenses. Hamman would then transfer the
lease to third parties for production, retaining an overriding royalty inter-
est. After Hamman's expenses had been recouped, the royalty would
then be divided equally between Hamman and Gaines. In the transaction
at issue, Hamman refused to share the override with Gaines, and the lat-
ter brought suit seeking to impose a constructive trust on it. The trial
court granted summary judgment for Hamman. On further appeal, the
court reversed and remanded the case for trial, holding that summary
judgment was improper because Gaines's allegations properly raised a
jury issue as to the existence of a confidential relationship with Hamman
at the time of the transaction in question. The court opined that, if
Gaines's version of the facts were found to be true, a confidential rela-
tionship "undoubtedly"' 1 5 existed between the parties and that, if a con-
structive trust were not imposed on the royalty interest, Hamman "would
be the recipient of an unjust enrichment resulting from the breach of a
confidential relationship." 16
In reaching its decision in Gaines, the Texas Supreme Court relied
heavily on its earlier decision in MacDonald v. Follett,117 a case with very
similar relevant facts. In MacDonald, however, the alleged wrong did not
occur until the renewal of the jointly-shared overriding royalty. As the
time for renewal approached, the defendant advised the plaintiff of that
fact and agreed to negotiate the renewal. He did so, but took it exclu-
sively in his own name. On these facts, the court ruled that it would have
"no difficulty"" 8 in finding that the "status existing between the parties
was one of trust and confidence at the time of the lease renewal transac-
tion at issue."'119
114. 358 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1962).
115. Id. at 560.
116. Id. For a case reaching the same result on almost identical relevant facts, see Hed-
ley v. DuPont, 580 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(allegations of plaintiff geologist that he would use his expertise to evaluate prospective oil
and gas properties for acquisition by defendants, who were to convey interests to plaintiff
after a certain pay out for expenses, were sufficient to support proof of a confidential
relationship as to properties in question and a breach of that relationship so that a con-
structive trust to prevent unjust enrichment could be imposed).
117. 180 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1944).
118. Id. at 337.
119. Id. at 338. The relationship of the parties in all these cases is very close to the
formal fiduciary one of joint venturers. Joint venture is a rather mercurial legal concept
which encompasses informal partnership relationships usually tied to a single transaction
or an identical series of transactions. Joint ventures are said to require four distinct ele-
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Although a demonstration of similarities between the transaction at is-
sue and prior business transactions in which the defendant did hold prop-
erty for the plaintiff's benefit may did significantly in giving credibility to
the alleged oral promise to hold property for the plaintiff, such a demon-
stration is not essential to persuading the court to contravene the deed or
other conveyance document that gives title to the defendant. The believ-
ability of the alleged oral transaction can be proved in other ways. For
example, in Jarrett v. Hall,120 credence was supplied by facts pertaining to
the conduct of the parties subsequent to the transaction at issue. Over a
period of approximately ten years, the parties had a business relationship
in which Hall sold railroad ties to Jarrett. It was Hall's practice to
purchase tracts of timber land, occasionally with Jarrett's financial assist-
ance, cut the timber into railroad ties, and sell the ties to Jarrett. The
transaction at issue involved a tract of land that Hall sought to purchase
for timber to supply Jarrett with ties. After negotiating a sales price, Hall
approach Jarrett for a loan to finance the purchase. The parties entered
into a preliminary agreement that Jarrett would finance the purchase if an
inspection proved that the land had sufficient timber for Hall to repay the
loan from its sale. Although many terms of the loan agreement were left
open, it was clear that both parties understood that the timber would be
the primary, but not the exclusive, source of repayment of the loan and
that the land and any timber remaining after the loan was paid would
belong to Hall. The inspection of the land proved positive and the parties
moved forward to finalize the purchase. The sale transpired, and title was
taken by Jarrett in his own name. This, however, was not inconsistent
with the parties' understanding that once the loan was repaid, title would
ments: (1) a mutual right of control; (2) a community of interests; (3) a sharing of profits;
and (4) a sharing of losses and expenses. See Patton v. Callaway, 522 S.W.2d 252, 256 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). At times these requirements can be quite tech-
nical. See Friedman v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 456 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ) (no joint venture because, although there would have been
"mutual" profit, it would not have been "shared" profit). In the shared override cases, the
courts usually have not concerned themselves with explaining why the transactions do not
qualify as joint ventures. In Patton v. Callaway, on similar but distinguishable facts, the
court ruled that the transaction at issue did not qualify as a joint venture because there was
no sharing of costs. In the instant cases, that reasoning is inapposite. A claimant who
shares in the profit only after the other party has recouped his initial outlay for expenses
has certainly "shared in those expenses." But regardless of whether one considers the
conclusion against joint venture to be overly technical, it is clear that the parties in these
cases share a "status" that is very close to a formal fiduciary one. It is thus not unduly
surprising to find that relationship to be "confidential" even though arising entirely in a
business context.
Other jurisdictions are no more precise than Texas in describing the requirements for ajoint venture. The Nebraska Supreme Court, for example, has broadly stated that a joint
venture arises when:
there [is] an agreement to enter into an undertaking in the objects of which
the parties have a community of interest and a common purpose in perform-
ance, and each of the parties must have equal voice in the manner of its
performance and control of the agencies used therein, though one may en-
trust the performance to the other.
Fangmeyer v. Reinwald, 263 N.W.2d 428, 434 (Neb. 1978).
120. 207 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1947, no writ).
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be transferred from Jarrett to Hall. Hall then moved onto the land and
lived there without objection from Jarrett and without paying rent for a
period of four years. During this period Jarrett continually delayed tak-
ing any of the timber from which the loan was to be repaid. Jarrett then
for the first time claimed ownership in the land and demanded rent from
Hall. Hall brought suit, and the trial court entered judgment granting
title to him subject to a lien in the amount of the loan due Jarrett. On
appeal, the court affirmed the trial court judgment, reasoning that a con-
fidential relationship existed between the parties at the time of the trans-
action at issue and that this relationship justified the imposition of a
constructive trust on the property in favor of Hall.
In a carefully reasoned opinion, the court emphasized the uncontro-
verted evidence at trial that supported both the existence of the confiden-
tial relationship between the parties and the believability of their alleged
oral agreement. The confidential relationship was evidenced by a lengthy
period of harmonious dealing during which a business friendship devel-
oped between the parties such that they became accustomed to extending
confidence and trust to each other in their business dealings. Further, it
was clear from the record that Jarrett was the dominant party in their
business dealings, given the fact that Hall was a man of little means and
little formal education. The believability of the alleged oral promise by
Jarrett was supported by the fact that their transactions over the years
were typically informal in nature and that in these transactions Hall re-
posed trust and confidence in Jarrett that he would be treated fairly.
Most importantly, the conduct of the parties subsequent to the purchase
of the property at issue indicated strongly that they regarded Hall as the
owner. Hall lived on the property in a cordial relationship with Jarrett for
a period of four years without paying rent and without demand from Jar-
rett for such payment. Further, during this period Hall farmed the land
for his own use and benefit and made various improvements to the prop-
erty, including adding a shed to the barn, a new roof to the house, and
maintaining the fences. Finally, Jarrett's taking title in his own name was
in no way inconsistent with the alleged oral agreement that ownership
would be transferred to Hall upon repayment of the loan. To allow Jar-
rett to take title to the property without advising Hall of his intent not to
abide by his oral promise to reconvey would, reasoned the court, allow
him to perpetrate a fraud upon Hall. Had Hall been made aware of Jar-
rett's undisclosed intent, he might well have made other arrangements for
financing the property and acquired it in his own name.
Indeed, in all of the above cases, involving as they do the breach of an
oral promise to reconvey all or part of an interest in property, the reten-
tion of the property by the defendant borders upon fraudulent wrongdo-
ing. It would take little stretch of the law of fraud, particularly fraudulent
nondisclosure, if any stretch at all in many cases, to find the defendant
guilty thereof and to use that fraud, rather than a confidential relation-
ship between the parties, as a basis for imposing equity jurisdiction. Per-
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haps it would be best if these cases were left to the law of fraud, rather
than confidential relationships, as the reason for invoking equity jurisdic-
tion. Proceeding in this manner would certainly simplify an understand-
ing of confidential relationships. Arguably, however, the better rule is as
we have it. The law of fraud is based upon established legal principles
and is far less flexible than the more fluid concept of confidential rela-
tionship. The fluidity of the latter better accommodates the policing
function of equity of achieving fair results when more structured legal
principles fail. The rule then should be, as it is, that even though a partic-
ular defendant has not technically been guilty of fraud, and even though
the relationship with the plaintiff is purely business oriented, he has been
guilty of the constructive fraud of violating a trust and confidence im-
posed in him by the plaintiff.
Regardless, this close correlation between actual fraud and the con-
structive fraud of breach of a fiduciary relationship has caused confusion
in defining the parameters of confidential relationships. In many cases,
where the defendant has clearly been guilty of a fraud that justifies the
imposition of equitable remedies, the courts go too far by holding that a
confidential relationship existed between the parties when nothing akin
to such a relationship is presented by the facts. To properly understand
the nature of confidential relationships, these overstatements by the
courts must be sorted out and not taken at face value.
A case in point is the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Schil-
ler v. Elick.121 Mr. Schiller had taken ill and he and his wife decided to
sell their farm. Mrs. Schiller was of German descent and spoke only bro-
ken English. Elick, an employee of the Federal Land Bank, was an ac-
quaintance of the Schillers and an occasional visitor to their home. At
the Schillers' request, Elick found a buyer who, according to Elick,
wanted to finance the purchase with a Federal Land Bank loan. Elick
misrepresented to the Schillers that the Federal Land Bank would not
make the loan unless the borrower obtained at least one-half of the min-
eral interest in the property. He persuaded the Schillers to convey to him
title to the property with half the mineral interest. Elick then conveyed
the property and one-fourth on the mineral interest to the buyer and,
without the knowledge of the Schillers, retained a one-fourth mineral in-
terest for himself. Upon discovering the facts, the Schillers brought ac-
tion against Elick and the trial court gave judgment in their favor,
imposing a constructive trust on the mineral interest retained by Elick
and granting money damages for the one-quarter interest conveyed to the
buyer.122
In affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court of Texas reasoned that
121. 240 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. 1951).
122. Although the court does not discuss the matter, the damage calculation was cor-
rect only if the buyer did not pay and the Schillers did not receive fair value for the one-
quarter mineral interest sold.
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the trial court properly made an "implied finding"'123 of fraud and breach
of a fiduciary relationship by Elick. That there was fraud and that a con-
structive trust was the proper remedy for that fraud is clear. However,
the only prior relationship between the parties referred to by the court
was that Elick was an acquaintance of the Schillers and an occasional
visitor to their home. That kind of relationship, of course, in no way justi-
fies the existence of the trust and confidence necessary to establish a con-
fidential relationship. The court, however, concluded to the contrary,
reasoning that a confidential relationship may be found whenever there is
an "overreaching made possible by a misplaced confidence.' 1 24 This ex-
traordinarily broad language, taken literally, would completely obscure
any distinction between fraud and the breach of a confidential relation-
ship and would, in essence, make both concepts identical. Certainly a
"misplaced confidence" is a core element of both, but it is only one ele-
ment of each. In Schiller, all the necessary elements for fraud were
clearly present. However, the additional elements for a confidential rela-
tionship were not. The "misplaced confidence" would indicate, without
more, only a subjective trust of the Schillers in Elick, and the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority is that a mere subjective trust will not establish a
confidential relationship. The only issue before the court was whether
parol evidence could be admitted to establish Elick's wrongdoing. Evi-
dence of fraud would not be barred by the rule, and the court's finding of
a confidential relationship was thus both unwarranted and
unnecessary. 125
The tension between the established rule that evidence of fraud is not
barred by the parol evidence rule and the equally fundamental rule that a
fraud claim fails where the true facts are obvious or readily discoverable
has caused many courts to rely on the concept of confidential relationship
to excuse a claimant's failure to discover the falsity of fraudulent asser-
tions by neglecting to read the written contract that she seeks to avoid.
On the one hand, one is bound by the obligations in a written contract
once it is signed; on the other, the writing should not establish a safe
harbor with provisions that would belie the fraudulent assertions. Where
the fraud would be readily discoverable from the writing, which should
prevail, the so-called duty to read or the defense of fraud in the induce-
123. Schiller, 240 S.W.2d at 998.
124. Id. at 1000.
125. See, e.g., Ward v. Taggart, 336 P.2d 534 (Cal. 1959), wherein the court on facts
similar to those in Schiller allowed the plaintiff recovery against the defendant for compen-
satory and punitive damages on theories of fraud and unjust enrichment. Taggart had
fraudulently represented to Ward that he was the exclusive agent for Sunset for the sale of
certain real estate that Ward was interested in purchasing. Ward submitted through an
agent an offer to purchase the property for $4000 an acre. Taggart misrepresented to Ward
that he had submitted the offer and that Sunset would only sell further for $5000 an acre.
Ward agreed to pay the $5000, and Taggart purchased the property himself from Sunset for
$4000, sold it to Ward for $5000, and pocketed the additional $1000 per acre. In allowing
the recovery, the court reasoned, inter alia, that Taggart's fraudulent misrepresentations




ment? Many courts leave resolution of the dilemma to the jury and allow
the claimant to proceed with the heavy burden of persuasion that she was
induced into the contract by assurances that are directly contradicted by
the signed writing.126
Other courts are more reluctant, evidencing a lesser trust of juries and
a greater reverence for the parol evidence rule, and require justifiable
reason for the claimant's reliance on the oral misrepresentation rather
than on the contrary, truthful written representation. Where the contra-
diction is not direct, that reason can be found by construing the writing as
reasonably consistent with the alleged missrepresentation. 127 Where the
conflict is direct, the courts occasionally resort to a quite liberal concept
of a confidential relationship to justify the claimant's failure to read and
her reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentation. It is in the business
relationship cases that this relaxed attitude toward confidential relation-
ships is most apparent because these cases directly contradict the basic
assumption, not characteristic of familial and friendship cases, that a busi-
ness relationship will not give rise to a confidential one. Indeed, it is in
these cases that exceptions will be found to the long lines of judicial deci-
sions holding that relationships such as employer/employee and creditor/
debtor are not confidential ones. 128
This relaxed attitude is understandable, even laudable. The only legal
maxim being violated is a flawed notion of a duty to read,129 and the only
126. Professor Murray trenchantly states the matter as follows:
Where the offeror has misrepresented the contents of the writing and the
offeree relies upon the misrepresentation without reading the document
before signing it, courts are confronted with the fraud of one party versus the
negligence of the other. While some older cases may be found holding the
offeree negligent notwithstanding the fraud of the offeror, the clearly prevail-
ing position is effectively suggested by a Kentucky court: "Is it better to en-
courage negligence in the foolish, or fraud in the deceitful?" Either course
has obvious dangers. But judicial experience exemplifies that the former is
the least objectionable, and least hampers the administration of pure justice.
JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACrs § 91, at 444 (3d ed. 1990), quoting Western
Mfg. Co. v. Cotton & Long, 104 S.W. 758, 760 (Ky. 1907).
127. See Northwestern Bank v. Roseman, 344 S.E.2d 120, 124 (N.C. 1986) (whether
party who failed to read the document was reasonable in relying on the misrepresentation
by other party is a question of fact). There is a minority view, held by a few courts, that the
parol evidence rule bars extrinsic evidence of promissory fraud, apparently to discourage
parties from alleging that every broken promise constitutes fraud. See E. ALLAN FARNS-
WORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.4, at 483 (2d ed. 1990). This minority view is discussed in Justin
Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAL. L. REV. 877 (1961).
128. See supra note 103.
129. No one seriously suggests either that this duty to read actually reflects the normal
human practice or even that it has the potential to channel human conduct in that direc-
tion. The unarguable fact is that people, as a rule, do not, and never will, read most con-
tracts they sign. For an early statement of the duty, see Sanger v. Dunn, 3 N.W. 388, 389(Wis. 1879) ("It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to
abide by its conditions, say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what
it contained."). Two very useful discussions of the duty can be found in John D. Calamari,
Duty to Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 341 (1974); Stewart Macaulay,
Private Legislation and the Duty to Read - Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of
Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1966); see also FARNSWORTH, supra
note 127, at §§ 4:14, 4:26, 7.5 & 7.9.
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trust being reposed by the claimant is in the veracity of the fraudfeasor
and, thus, the lack of a necessity of performing the often tedious task of
reading the document one is about to sign. It would be error, however, to
read these cases beyond their facts as representative of the general atti-
tude of the courts toward the parameters of confidential relationships.
For example, in Sheffield v. Lewis130 the court affirmed the judgment of
the trial court canceling a mineral deed that had been procured by the
fraudulent misrepresentation that the deed was a lease. The facts indi-
cated that the plaintiff was an ignorant woman, only marginally literate,
who lacked knowledge or understanding of oil and gas matters. The de-
fendant was an experienced oil and gas man who procured the deed from
the plaintiff by fraudulent misrepresentation and for a grossly inadequate
consideration. There was no relationship between the parties prior to the
transaction at issue. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff's action was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations because the fraud was rea-
sonably discoverable by the plaintiff, presumably by reading the deed it-
self, more than four years prior to her filing the cause of action. 131 The
court rejected this argument, however, reasoning that any discovery of
the fraud or inquiry into it was excused by a confidential relationship
between plaintiff and defendant because they "were not dealing solely at
arm's' length but that a relationship of trust and confidence existed be-
tween the parties.' 32 Once again, the court's conclusion is unfortunate
in that it merely treats the defendant's fraud as a surrogate for establish-
ing a confidential relationship between the parties and for squaring doc-
trine with result. And, once again, the court's conclusion is unnecessary,
because the fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the meaning and
content of a writing, particularly when made to one who is largely illiter-
ate, is in itself sufficient ground for delaying inquiry into the actual mean-
ing of the writing.' 33
Similarly, in Fipps v. Stidham,134 the court found that a debtor had al-
leged sufficient facts to show a confidential relationship with his creditor.
130. 287 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1956, no writ).
131. The court noted well established case law to the effect that a grantor is charged
with knowledge of the deed. Id. at 536.
132. Id. at 535.
133. The court's resort to finding a confidential relationship between the parties is
made all the more inexplicable by its clear understanding that a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion as to the content of a writing may be relied upon to excuse a further inquiry into the
actual content of the writing. In its analysis, the court relied heavily upon and quoted
extensively from Kennedy v. Brown, 113 S.W.2d 1018 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, writ
denied), in which the court noted that the rule charging a grantor with knowledge of the
contents of a deed is usually restricted to cases in which the grantor, rather than the
grantee, prepares the deed, and in which the court concluded:
Thus it is clear that in the above cases had the facts shown that the grantees
in the deeds involved in those cases had done any act or made statements
which would have been sufficient to lull the grantor to sleep, then it seems to
us that limitation under the exception set out above would not have begun to
run against the grantor until they had [actually] discovered the mistake.
Id. at 1020, quoted in Sheffield, 287 S.W.2d at 536.
134. 50 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1935).
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The suit was on a renewal note, and the fraud alleged was a failure by the
creditor to disclose terms in the new note disadvantageous to the debtor.
The renewal note represented a continuance of one of only two transac-
tions, both arm's length loans, in which the parties had previously en-
gaged. Prior to the renewal, which was handled by the original creditor, a
bank, the note had been sold to a bank officer, who purchased the note
because bank examiners had criticized the underlying loan that the officer
had negotiated with the debtor. The purchase of the note by the officer
was not disclosed to the debtor by the bank, which the court found
treated its affairs and those of its officer interchangeably. The defense to
the fraudulent nondisclosure claim was that the debtor should have rea-
sonably discovered the true facts by reading the renewal note, and the
court noted that in "a long line of decisions"'135 it had "steadfastly
ruled"' 36 that a failure of a debtor to read a renewal note acted as a
waiver of any fraud claim for nondisclosure of the terms of the note.
Nevertheless, the court ruled in favor of the debtor because a confidential
relationship existed between the bank and the debtor at the time the note
was renewed. The bank thus had a duty to disclose that in renewing the
note it was acting as an agent for its officer and to disclose payment terms
in the note disadvantageous to the debtor. The debtor was a man of little
education who was unable to compute the new payment obligations with-
out assistance, and the bank had lulled the debtor into a false sense of
security that justified his failure to inquire more closely into the actual
facts.
The courts have used the concept of confidential relationship as a sur-
rogate for a technically flawed fraud claim in all types of business rela-
tionships including these customarily held not to give rise to trust and
confidences. In Cochran v. Murrah, 37 for example, the court upheld the
trial court's finding that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to support
a confidential relationship with his employer. The suit was to cancel a
release signed by the plaintiff and to recover damages for unpaid wages
and medical expenses resulting from a work-related accident suffered by
the plaintiff. At the time of the signing of the release, the plaintiff had
been employed by the defendant for over eight years as a farm laborer.
His wages were set at $70 a week, and he was allowed to live rent-free in
a house provided by the employer. However, some weeks he was paid
less than $70. The plaintiff never inquired as to the reason for the lesser
payments, but trusted his employer to pay him what was fair. The em-
ployer had persuaded the plaintiff to sign the release while he was bedrid-
den from his injuries and under the influence of pain medication. The
employer fraudulently represented to the plaintiff that the release obli-
gated the insurance company to continue making payments to him for
lost wages and medical bills when in fact the agreement released the em-
135. Id. at 683.
136. Id.
137. 219 S.E.2d 421 (Ga. 1975).
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ployer and the insurance company from all claims arising from the acci-
dent. The plaintiff signed the release without reading it and later testified
that: "He can read, but never does."'1 38 The court held that the plaintiff's
uncontroverted allegations were sufficient to establish a confidential rela-
tionship between the parties and that the plaintiff was thus justified in
relying on the employer's representations rather than reading the docu-
ment itself. Although the facts in Cochran supporting a confidential rela-
tionship are stronger than in most of these "failed fraud" cases, most
courts would probably find that the plaintiff's infirmity arising from his
injuries and the influence of pain medication provided sufficient excuse
for his failure to read. This excuse, coupled with the plaintiff's uncontro-
verted allegations of fraud, would represent an adequate basis for setting
aside the release without having the court resort to a finding of a confi-
dential relationship between the parties.
But the lesson is clear. In fraud cases, the courts often equate fraud
with breach of a confidential relationship, even in circumstances where
the equation is unnecessary because the fraud itself, notwithstanding the
absence of a confidential relationship, furnishes the basis for allowing the
equitable relief sought. These cases surely intend no marked deviation
from the normal assumption that business dealings do not give rise to
confidential relationships. They should not be read to send a false signal
regarding the parameters of confidential relationships, but must be rele-
gated to their particular facts. In them, the fictitious confidential rela-
tionship acts as a disguised and unnecessary surrogate for a technically
flawed fraud.
V. AFTERWORD
Conclusion would be folly. Any study of this daunting area of equity
will reveal as many questions as answers. Yet surprisingly little has been
written about it. Perhaps that is because polycentric legal concepts- and
confidential relationship is a quintessential example-defy firm resolu-
tion across the broad spectrum. Yet a good amount of synthesis, at the
least, is possible.
This much seems clear. When the courts attempt to define confidential
relationship, they do so in quite broad terms that capture its flavor with-
out divulging its roux. Their lack of candor is admittedly intentional. The
purpose is to leave the doctrine fluid so that it can be tailored to achieve
justice in a broad panorama of factual settings. Uncertainty is regarded
as a fair price to achieve this end. Nevertheless, the courts have estab-
lished a few clear principles that provide a sketchy roadmap. The essen-
tial element of a confidential relationship is a justifiable reposing of trust
by one party in another that the other will treat that party's interests at
least on a par with his own. Indeed, a confidential relationship is usually
defined simply, and broadly, as one in which one justifiably expects that
138. Id. at 421.
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the other will care for his interest and welfare. That expectation must
not be merely subjective and must arise from circumstances existing prior
to the alleged illicit transaction at issue.
If the trust is justifiably reposed, a confidential relationship will arise.
However, the expectation that one will place his own interests sub-
servient to those of another is so extraordinary to human nature that it
will understandably exist only within special societal relationships. When
the societal relationship is one of loving family members or close personal
friends, the justification for and reasonableness of reposing trust one in
the other is readily understandable. The familial and close personal
friendship cases might often have been unpredictable to the lawyers that
tried them, and even to the trial judges that heard them, but their ulti-
mate results are usually easy to understand. If the courts were to confine
confidential relationship to only those cases, the concept would be far
more concrete. It is the extension of the concept into business relation-
ships that causes confusion by sending the false signal that a confidential
relationship can arise from virtually any ongoing interaction between
people.
Like the wolf at the campfire, confidential relationship has no rightful
place within the business setting. The prevailing general rule, stated in
innumerable cases, is that a confidential relationship cannot arise from
purely business interaction regardless of its constancy and duration. It is
a rule rare in the exception if one looks to categories of exception rather
than to the large number of cases that fall within the categories. The
categories themselves are formed by cases governed by underdeveloped
or otherwise flawed legal doctrine. Two principal examples comprise the
bulk of the cases, examples I have labeled "near joint ventures" and
"failed fraud" claims. Parties to an oral joint venture or partnership, of
course, owe fiduciary duties to each other as a matter of law because of
their status as partners or joint venturers. In the "near joint venture"
cases, one party agrees to hold property or an interest therein, such as a
royalty interest, with legal title in his name but with the oral understand-
ing that the property is held for mutual profit and for the use and benefit
of both parties. It is unclear in these cases why the oral agreement does
not fit within the established definition of an oral partnership or joint
venture. In the usual case, the court opines that a joint venture did not
exist but does not explain the reason for its conclusion. However, based
upon similar past transactions between the parties, the court concludes
instead that a confidential relationship existed between the parties that
justified the claimant's trust that the other would honor the oral promise.
The refusal simply to find in favor of joint venture is baffling. The use of
confidential relationship as a surrogate for joint venture is confusing.
In the "failed fraud" cases, the defendant's alleged fraud is contra-
dicted by a signed writing. The courts thus face the recurring conundrum
of giving full effect to the writing by excluding the contradictory parol
evidence at the risk of giving countenance to the defendant's fraud.
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Those courts that opt in favor of enforcing the parol evidence rule often
strain to find a confidential relationship between the parties, based upon
prior business transactions, and then refuse to allow the defendant to
shelter behind the rule. It is, of course, perplexing why fraudfeasors are
thereby given more favorable treatment than are fiduciaries and why it is
not better left to the fact finder to decide the believability of a claim of
oral fraud that is contradicted by a writing signed by the claimant.
Although extending the concept of confidential relationship to both
these categories of purely business relationships is perhaps unwar-
ranted-refining the flawed legal doctrine being the better approach-if
the cases are treated as sui generis and confined to their general catego-
ries, the concept of confidential relationship remains the province of fa-
milial relationships and of those based upon close friendships, and the
business relationship that gives rise to the concept becomes an identifi-
able anomaly. Thereby, the concept of confidential relationship becomes
more understandable.
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